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CORBIN AND FULLER'S CASES ON
CONTRACTS (1942?): THE CASEBOOK THAT
NEVER WAS
Scott D. Gerber*
Arthur L. Corbin (1874-1967) and Lon L. Fuller (1902-1978) are two
of the giants of American legal education. In June of 1940 they
agreed to collaborate on a Contracts casebook. A series of letters
between the two, unpublished until now, sheds considerable light on
law teaching both then and today.
More specifically, the
correspondence reveals that the pedagogic question that most
divides modern Contracts teachers-whether to start the course with
formation or remedies-has its origins in the planned Corbin-Fuller
casebook. The consequence of the disagreement between Corbin,
who preferred to start with formation, and Fuller, who was
determined to begin with remedies, was not simply that their joint
casebook fell apart: It also set in motion a string of events that
makes plain that the ghost of Christopher Columbus Langdell (18261906)-the doyen of legal formalism and the father of the casebook
method-continues to haunt the halls of America's law schools.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG

No course is more closely associated with the first-year law school
experience than Contracts. Indeed, mere mention of the first-year
experience likely brings to students' minds the imposing visage of
John Houseman calling on "Mr. Hart" in perhaps the most famous
scene in the most famous movie ever made about law school, The
Paper Chase.1 Those steeped in the first-year experience also are not
* Assistant Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern
University. Ph.D., J.D., University of Virginia; B.A., The College of William and
Mary. I am grateful to the Harvard Law School Library for its permission, in its
capacity as custodian of the Lon L. Fuller Papers, for the publication of
correspondence between Lon L. Fuller and Arthur L. Corbin concerning their
proposed Contracts casebook. I am also grateful to Gustaf W. Olson for research
assistance and to George Athan Billias, Barbara Aronstein Black, William R. Casto,
Howard N. Fenton, Daniel S. Guy, Stewart Macaulay, Sandra F. McDonald, Joseph
M. Perillo, Stephen B. Presser, John Henry Schlegel, Stephen C. Veltri, and G.
Edward White for comments on a draft. The Article is dedicated to Professor Perillo
for his many contributions to Contracts. See generally Symposium, A Tribute to
ProfessorJoseph M. Perillo, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 623 (2002).

1. The Paper Chase (Twentieth Century Fox 1973). The movie was based on
John Jay Osborn, Jr.'s 1971 novel of the same name.
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likely to forget what a central role Contracts occupied in Scott
Turow's memoir One L.2
Contracts is, of course, more than merely the stuff of award-winning
motion pictures (Houseman won an Oscar for his performance as
Professor Kingsfield) 3 and best-selling trade books (Turow went on to
even greater fame and fortune as an author of legal thrillers).4 It is
the consummate law school course: rich in history, doctrine, and
theory. However, Contracts is also a course-perhaps more than any
other-about which law teachers disagree pedagogically. And the
disagreement is not simply over which cases to assign. It is about
where to begin.
The choices of where to start a Contracts course are principally
three: at the formation stage (i.e., offer and acceptance), at the
remedies stage (i.e., post-breach), or with a brief introduction to
remedies before the formation materials are addressed in depth. John
D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo's Cases and Problems on Contracts
is probably the leading contemporary casebook that begins at the
formation stage.5 Although Calamari and Perillo do not explain why
they do so, Professor Perillo was kind enough to tell me why: "It
seems natural. That's how the textbooks and treatises run."6
John P. Dawson, William Burnett Harvey, and Stanley D.
Henderson's Contracts: Cases and Comment7 is likely the leading
contemporary example of the remedies-first approach. Professor
Henderson explains in the preface why the casebook is organized in
this fashion:
The authors of this book have believed that contract law is best
understood-the broad conceptions as well as the formal rules and
technical formulations-if it is approached through a remedycentered study. The underlying purposes of contract law (what it
seeks to protect, and how it hopes to accomplish its aims) are
revealed most clearly when problems are looked at from a
perspective of taking care of harms or losses, or gains held unjustly.
We think it important that students see that the limitations of
2. Scott Turow, One L (1977).
3. http://academyawards.20m.com/award46.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
4. E.g., Scott Turow, Presumed Innocent (1987).
5. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Cases and Problems on Contracts
(1978). The casebook is now in its third edition. John D. Calamari et al., Cases and
Problems on Contracts (3d ed. 2000). Professor Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender joined
Professors Calamari and Perillo on the second edition. John D. Calamari et al., Cases
and Problems on Contracts (2d ed. 1989). Calamari is deceased.
6. E-mail from Joseph M. Perillo, Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham
University School of Law, to Scott D. Gerber, Assistant Professor of Law, Claude W.
Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University (Apr. 24, 2003, 11:52:19 EDT) (on
file with author).
7. John P. Dawson, William Burnett Harvey & Stanley D. Henderson, Contracts:
Cases and Comment (8th ed. 2003). I was a student of Professor Henderson at the
University of Virginia School of Law.
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contract in our society are no small part of the story of its functions,
and that the business of "enforcing" (perhaps dismantling) unkept
bargains has much to contribute in the fixing of those limits and,
accordingly, the forming of a working understanding of the law of
contract as a whole. In a word, when a dispute over an obligation
voluntarily assumed ends up in court, the great question of "when"
to enforce cannot8 be detached from the also-great question of
"how" to enforce.

E. Allan Farnsworth, William F. Young, and Carol Sanger's
9
is almost certainly the leading
Contracts: Cases and Materials
example of the hybrid approach. Professors Farnsworth, Young, and

Sanger do not explain in the casebook itself why they have adopted a
hybrid approach, but they do so in the teacher's manual that
accompanies it." Their rationale is very similar to that of Dawson,
Harvey, and Henderson:
Why have we put this brief introduction to remedies first? The
introductory text addresses this question. Before asking what
promises the law will or should enforce, it is helpful to know what is
meant by enforce. Although the general treatment of remedies is
deferred to Chapter 5, the present section makes two points. (1)
The law of contract remedies is generous in that it usually protects
the injured party's expectation. (This is an essential point in
discussions in Chapter 1 of situations, notably those related to
Restatement Second § 90, in which recovery is limited to the
reliance interest, and in Chapter 2 of situations in which courts are
reluctant to find agreement.) (2) The law of contract remedies is
stingy in protecting no more than a party's expectation. (This is an
essential point for an understanding of breach of contract, which
generally carries no punitive damages, is only exceptionally
sanctioned by specific relief, and sometimes leaves the party that has
broken the contract better off than if the contract had been
performed.[)] 1

Farnsworth, Young, and Sanger devote the first section of their first
chapter to this task (the balance of the chapter concerns the
traditional bases for enforcing promises).

They then spend three

chapters on formation, return to remedies in chapter five, and close
with chapters on interpretation, performance and breach, basic
assumptions, third party beneficiaries, and assignment and delegation.

I have never taught Contracts in the manner suggested by
Professors Farnsworth, Young, and Sanger. I have taught the course
in the other two ways, however. I have found it better for the students

to begin with formation.

They seem to find it much easier to

8. Id. at iii.
9. E. Allan Farnsworth et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials (6th ed. 2001).
10. E. Allan Farnsworth et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials, Manual for
Teachers (6th ed. 2001).
11. Id. at 1-2.
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understand in the opening days of their law school experience what an
"offer" is, for example, than what the "reliance interest" is. This said,
my two colleagues at Ohio Northern University College of Law who
teach Contracts on a regular basis prefer the hybrid approach, and
many a law professor around the country thinks that it is best to start
with remedies. For example, Professor Christopher W. Frost of the
University of Kentucky College of Law writes as follows in an article
in a recent symposium on teaching Contracts:
There is considerable pedagogical value to starting contract
problems by focusing on the stakes. In a general sense, the early
focus on remedies reinforces students' appreciation of the fact that
the law is intended to do something. It exists to right wrongs in a
meaningful way. This approach sets a purposive tone for the course
that forces students to move from abstraction to real effect. More
specifically, Fuller and Perdue's methodology provides an early
opportunity to engage students in standard legal reasoning. The
formulaic approach channels their consideration of the facts of a
specific case leading them to predictable numerical results. With a
common starting point, the instructor is free to challenge the
normative bases of the
analysis and the factual assumptions on
12
which the results rely.
Again, I personally believe that Contracts teachers such as
Professor Frost underestimate the difficulty beginning law students
have with the remedies-first approach. As will be seen in a moment,
Arthur L. Corbin felt this way too. 3 In fact, Corbin's disagreement
with Lon L. Fuller on this pedagogic point-Frost mentions Fuller in
his article-has had profound implications for Contracts teachers and
students alike. It is to the basis of that disagreement that I now turn.
II. THE CORBIN-FULLER CORRESPONDENCE
During the process of trying to locate Corbin's papers for an article
I was hoping to write about his theory of Contracts, I stumbled upon a
12. Christopher W. Frost, Reconsidering the Reliance Interest, 44 St. Louis U. L.J.
1361, 1362 (2000).
13. See infra Part II. Professor Douglas L. Leslie of the University of Virginia
School of Law argues for the "casefile" approach that is common in the nation's
business schools. Perhaps for the purpose of making a persuasive case for his
preferred alternative, Leslie mocks the question at the heart of the present article.
He writes:
It is hard to believe that a book's structure (how it orders the materials)
ought to count for much. I have heard it said that Lon Fuller's choice to
begin his contracts casebook with damages, rather than offer and
acceptance, was a breakthrough. If I may quibble; starting a course in
contracts with remedies for breach may well have been revolutionary, and
the very best way to teach Contracts; but a professor can do it with any
contracts casebook. Just begin the course with Chapter Nine.
Douglas L. Leslie, How Not to Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: Powerpoint,
Laptops, and the Casefile Method, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2000).
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file in the Fuller Papers at Harvard Law School that contains a series
of letters between Corbin and Fuller, unpublished until now, about a
Contracts casebook they had agreed to co-edit. 14 Corbin (1874-1967)
and Fuller (1902-1978) are two of the giants of American legal
education. Corbin taught at Yale Law School from 1903 to 1943.'1 He
also served as president of the Association of American Law
Schools, 16 he was a teacher and "father in the law" to Karl N.
Llewellyn,17 a friend and protector of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,"8 a
devotee of Benjamin N. Cardozo,19 the chief aide to Samuel Williston
on the Restatement of Contracts,2 arguably one of the original legal
realists 2 and the author of what has been called the "greatest law
book ever written ' ' 2-his multi-volume treatise on Contracts.23
Fuller spent the first part of his law teaching career at the
universities of Oregon and Illinois and at Duke University. 24 He
taught at Harvard Law School from 1939 until his retirement in 1972.
He has been called by his biographer "one of the four most important
American legal theorists" of the twentieth century (the other three
being Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, and Karl
Llewellyn).2 6 He published widely on the relation of law to morality
and reason,27 legal process,28 legal method, 9 and legal education.30
Although his writings on contract law are few in number, his article
14. For more on my search for Corbin's papers, and for a catalog of those I
managed to find, see Scott D. Gerber, An Ivy League Mystery: The Lost Papers of
Arthur Linton Corbin, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 605 (2002).
15. See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960, at 98-144 (1986).
16. Robert H. Jerry, II, Arthur L. Corbin: His Kansas Connection, 32 Kan. L.
Rev. 753, 759 (1984).
17. William Twining, The Karl Llewellyn Papers 111 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions: As Applied in Judicial Reasoning vii, vii-xv (reprint
1978) (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). Corbin was greatly influenced by Hohfeld's
conceptual approach to the law, and he convinced Williston to adopt it in the
Restatement of Contracts.Id. at xii.
19. Corbin was responsible for persuading Cardozo to deliver the series of Storrs
Lectures at Yale Law School that resulted in Cardozo's classic book, The Nature of
the Judicial Process, published in 1921. Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process
Revisited: Introduction,71 Yale L.J. 195, 196-98 (1961).
20. Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography 312 (1940).
21. William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 26-40 (1973).
22. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 63-64 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., rev.
ed. 1995).
23. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the
Rules of Contract Law (1950).
24. Robert S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller 1 (1984).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964).
28. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Problems of Jurisprudence (temp. ed. 1949).
29. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (1940).
30. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of
Lawyers, 1 J. Legal Educ. 189 (1948).
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3 1 remains one of
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
the most
influential in the field.
In that article, co-written with his research assistant William R.
Perdue, Jr., Fuller maintained that the appropriate measure of
damages for breach of contract cannot be ascertained without
understanding the function contract damage awards are supposed to
perform. He identified three purposes or "interests" as central: the
expectation interest, the restitution interest, and the reliance interest.
Importantly, it was The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, or
more precisely, the importance Fuller placed on that article as a
pedagogic device, that eventually led to the abandonment of the
Corbin-Fuller Contracts casebook.32

A. The PublishingAgreement
Corbin and Fuller entered into a three-page contract with West
Publishing Company on June 8, 1940, "to prepare a casebook known
as Corbin and Fuller's Cases on Contracts." The manuscript was to be
completed by October 1, 1941.
The publishing agreement is
reproduced below:
THIS AGREEMENT, made in triplicate this eghth of June A.D.
1940, by and between Arthur L. Corbin of New Haven, Connecticut,
and Lon L. Fuller of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Parties of the first part (hereinafter called the authors) and West
Publishing Company, of St. Paul, Minnesota, party of the second
part (hereinafter called the publisher)
WITNESSETH THAT:
1. Agreements by Authors.
To prepare a casebook on the subject of Contracts to be known as
Corbin and Fuller's Cases on Contracts, containing about 1200 pages
of text in the typography of the American Casebook Series, for the
use of teachers and students in law schools, conforming to the style
of treatment and arrangement of the American Casebook Series.
Will prepare their manuscript in printed or typewritten form and
31. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936) (classifying contract damages in terms of
expectation, restitution, and reliance interests). The article, characterized as "gospel"
by many Contracts scholars, see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Perspectives on Contract Law
3 (2d ed. 2001), is not without its critics, see, e.g., Richard Craswell, Against Fullerand
Perdue, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99 (2000) (arguing that Fuller and Perdue's three-way
classification scheme is no longer a useful analytic tool).
32. See infra Part II.E.
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deliver the complete manuscript of said casebook to the publisher
on or before the first day of October, 1941, said manuscript to be
satisfactory to the publisher. Manuscript is to be prepared by said
Fuller and to be submitted to said Corbin, Fuller's decision to be
final in case of any differences subject only to judgment of Warren
A. Seavey, General Editor of American Casebook Series.
To cite both the various units of the National Reporter System and
the State Reports to each case authority, so that the work may be
equally usable with the Reporters or State Reports.
To cite only primary authorities, i.e. the adjudicated cases, and not
refer to compilations of authorities such as digests, encyclopedias,
etc., except as occasionally incident to other primary authorities.
The above is not intended to exclude the citation of law review
articles and notes.
To submit, as soon as conveniently possible, a fair sample of
manuscript in reasonably complete form for publisher's examination
and suggestions.
Will not use, in the preparation of said work, any material, the
copyright of which is not owned by the publisher, or for which the
authors or publisher have not received a license authorizing said use.
As soon as said manuscript has been accepted by the publisher and
put into type, will read and revise the proofs as rapidly as furnished
and will do all usual and necessary things to expedite publication of
the work.
[W]ill prepare a subject matter index under an alphabetical
arrangement.
Except as provided below, will not edit, prepare or publish, under
their own name or otherwise, or allow to be prepared or published,
under their own name, any work-which may injure or interfere
with the sale of said casebook.
Will pay any costs in excess of fifty dollars for making alterations in
copy requested by them after same has been set in type.
2. Agreements by Publisher.
Upon receipt and acceptance of said manuscript, to put it into type
promptly and to provide authors with proofs promptly for reading,
checking and indexing.
To provide all paper, stationery, etc., usual to such undertakings, as
authors may require to complete the work.
To provide, in the form of signatures from the National Reporter
System, or photostatic copies, any cases that the authors may require
for the text of their casebook.
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Will pay to authors, in consideration of said completed manuscript, a
royalty in the amount of 18% of the net selling price on all books
sold said royalty to be divided as follows: 6% to Arthur L. Corbin
and 12% to Lon L. Fuller.
Will render to authors an accounting upon sales and royalties and
pay all accrued royalties the first day of February and August,
yearly.
To prepare, without expense to authors, a Table of Cases for said
work.
Will supply authors, promptly upon publication, with 8 copies each
of said work, without charge.
3. Miscellaneous Agreements.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as preventing the
publisher from publishing another work on the same subject.
Copyright of said work shall be taken out in the name of the West
Publishing Company.
Style of said work, as well as number of volumes, price, distribution,
advertising, etc., shall be decided by the publisher.
In case a new edition, revision or supplement to said work shall
become necessary, publisher shall have the option of publishing
same.
At the end of five years from date of publication of the above
casebook said West Publishing Company agrees to arrange for the
publication of a new edition of said casebook which shall be in the
name of said Fuller, the royalties on such edition to be paid to said
Fuller and to be not less than the royalties on this edition now paid
to Corbin and Fuller, or in the alternative, if it does not then desire
to publish a new edition, to permit said Fuller to publish a casebook
on the subject using such material of the present book as he sees fit.
IN WITNESS, WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their
hands the day and year first above written.
Arthur L. Corbin

Witness
Winifred N. Russell
Witness
J. E. Turner
Witness

Author
Lon L. Fuller
Author
WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY
By W. A. Ammons, Pres.
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B. Fuller Makes an Early Pushfor a Remedies-FirstApproach
The structure of the publishing agreement, in terms of both royalty
allocation and decision-making authority, makes clear that Fuller was
to be responsible for the lion's share of the work on the casebook.
The following October 7, 1940, letter from Fuller to Corbin suggests
why: Fuller was being asked to bring out Corbin's existing casebook
in a third edition. Although the correspondence archived at Harvard
does not indicate the reason Corbin was essentially turning over his
casebook to Fuller-the publication agreement reproduced above
provides that any subsequent edition would be Fuller's alone-it was
almost certainly so that Corbin could devote more of his time and
attention to his Contracts treatise.33 The October 7 letter also makes
plain how early in the project Fuller had decided to begin the third
edition with remedies.
October 7, 1940
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I have been intending to write you for a long time to give you a
report on my work on the third edition of your casebook, but had
delayed until I could furnish a fairly definite prospectus. Naturally I
want to take just as large an advantage as I can of your counsel; on
the other hand, I understand perfectly that the real labor of the
revision is mine, and that because of your work on your treatise you
don't want to be bothered with details. I don't know as yet how we
can best work together. If you would like for me to do so, I shall be
glad to make a trip down to New Haven sometime in the course of
the winter so that we can talk over the whole matter. Or would you
prefer for me to send along to you the individual chapters as I get
them ready?
By the way of purely "Inoperative Preliminary Negotiation" I
should like to list the principal changes I would like to introduce into
the book. These are naturally in addition to the substitution of new
cases for some of those in the book, changes in order, etc. I list these
changes in the approximate order of their importance to me, i.e., in

33. See Corbin, supra note 23. It is unclear precisely why Corbin agreed to let
Fuller be the one to take over his casebook. The only reference to the matter that I
have managed to locate appears in a September 9, 1940, letter from Corbin to Karl N.
Llewellyn. The reference, which comes at the end of a paragraph in which Corbin
talks about the cases Fuller cited in his reliance article, is: "Fuller is using my
casebook; and I have agreed to let him get out a new edition of it. This indicates
respect." Letter from Arthur L. Corbin, Professor Emeritus, Yale Law School, to Karl
Llewellyn, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law (Sept. 9, 1940) (on
file with the D'Angelo Law Library, University of Chicago).
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the order of their importance from the standpoint of my own use of
the book in class.
(1) I should like to introduce a new introductory section running
about 15 cases, to be entitled something like, "The General Scope of
the Legal Protection Accorded Promissory Expectancies." (I would
prefer a less highbrow designation for this chapter; perhaps
something less forbidding will suggest itself later.) This section
would deal with the problem of enforcement in general terms. I
have worked out the details of the chapter pretty well, and if you
would like I would be glad to send you a list of the cases I want to
include, and some indication of the character of the notes. My
object in this section will be to bring home to the student the fact
that back of the question, "Is there a contract?" there always lies a
more specific problem of enforcement. I believe that the cases I
have selected are also sufficiently simple, and stand sufficiently on
their own feet, so that this first section can also serve to introduce
him to the problem of abstracting and analyzing cases generally. I
should include cases illustrating in very general terms the various
measures of recovery for breach of contract, illustrating what might
be called a "qualified enforcement" such as New York gives the
contract to pay an attorney's fee. I should also include Clark v.
Marsiglia (or Wigent v. Marrs) and Hadley v. Baxendale to illustrate
the limits on enforcement. (I find it very difficult [to] discuss Offord
v. Davies and Rague v. New York Evening Post without the
principle of mitigating damages.) At the end of the chapter I should
This chapter would
insert a note on specific performance.
incidentally take up the problem of indefinite contracts, and show
how restitution would be granted generally no matter how vague the
contract, that what I call "the reliance interest" would, in case the
contract were a little more definite, receive either direct (see Kearns
v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181) or indirect (see Morris v. Ballard)
recognition, and that the courts would be least inclined to protect
the expectancy.
(2) I should like to insert at the beginning of the section on
consideration a rather long textual analysis of the problem of
consideration and the seal, which would be partly based on the
present introductory notes, but which in part would go considerably
beyond them.
(3) As a part of the same scheme, I should like to cut down the
present section on sealed contracts, substituting text for a good
many of the cases, and move the whole section up between the
proposed new note on consideration and the seal and the cases on
consideration. (I have taught the thing this way now for about five
years.)
(4) 1 should like to introduce into the section on "Reliance on a
Promise as Consideration" three cases on estoppel in pais, which
will serve to bring out the relation between "promissory estoppel"
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and "estoppel in pais," and will also illustrate the problem of the
measure of relief to be granted.
(5) 1 should like in various places (particularly in the chapter on
Assignment) to substitute an introductory note on the history of the
subject for the older cases now included. This is, of course, simply in
order to save time. (As you perhaps know, we have only five hours
for contracts here, and the tendency over the country as a whole
seems to be to cut down the time allowed for the subject.)
(6) Though I have no very definite opinion about the matter as
yet, I am inclined toward moving the chapters on Assignment and
Beneficiaries toward the middle of the book. From the standpoint
of correlating contracts with other first-year courses, particularly
agency, I believe that an arrangement which takes up these subjects
at an earlier time is better.
(7) I should like to include a short section on the parol evidence
rule.
This seems, as one glances over it, a rather formidable list, but it
affects, after all, only a small portion of the total work. Naturally all
of these plans are tentative, and I want to get all the help and advice
I can from you before reaching any definite decisions. Particularly I
should like to know what changes you would consider desirable,
other than those I have mentioned.
I have thought some of sending out a questionnaire to those now
using the book, asking them for suggestions. What do you think of
the idea?
If the proposals I have enumerated are too extensive to make it
convenient for you to discuss them in a letter, and you would prefer
for me to come down to see you before going[] to work on them,
please let me know. On the other hand, if they meet with your
approval in a general way, I would be glad if you would say so, as I
would then feel fairly confident in going ahead with the actual work
of writing the notes, abridging the cases, etc.
Sincerely yours,
LLF:HGL
P.S. If in your use of the casebook in class you have worked out a
scheme of omissions or rearrangements I should like to have a copy
as soon as possible.
Corbin responded on November 7, 1940, in a letter that suggests he
had failed to appreciate how revolutionary at least one of Fuller's
proposed revisions was: the one-the first in importance to Fuller
himself-about opening the third edition with remedies. Corbin

606

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

addresses some of Fuller's suggestions about remedies, but he does
not say a word about the plan to open the casebook with them.
YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Professor of Law

November 7, 1940.

Professor Lon L. Fuller
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Mr. Fuller:
Here at Yale, I am now compelled to teach the subject of
"Contracts" in two parts:
/ 2 hours throughyear
Contracts I in about 60 class-room hours of the First year;
/ 3 hours one semester
Contracts II in about 45 hours of the Second year.
This has led me to subdivide the materials as follows, probably
somewhat as you have yourself been doing:
Contracts I
Mutual Assent
Consideration
Seal
Discharge
3d Parties (Beneficiaries
(Assignees

Joint and Several
Contracts II
Operative Effect of Contract
(being the character and limits of the rights, duties,
powers, etc., that are consequent upon a contract)
Interpretation
Constructive Conditions
Impossibility and
other like factors
Repudiation (and other Breaches, Anticipatory, etc.)
Judicial Remedies
Damages

Restitution
Spec. Performance <-?
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Illegality
Statute of Frauds
I write this to suggest the possibility of publishing the new edition
in two separate and somewhat smaller volumes, at least for such
schools as would like to divide the subject into two courses. For
other schools it would still be possible to bind the material in a
single volume.
Perhaps this would make desirable a very moderate expansion of
the material dealing with Judicial Remedies. Even in a school that
offers such separate courses as Damages, Quasi Contracts, and
Specific Performance, the students can seldom elect them all.
I feel strongly that in all schools, the Remedies available for
enforcement should be considered along with the other parts of
Contract law. Without doubt, the same may be said of Property and
Torts. I do not go so far as to include Court Procedure. There is
much overlapping that is unavoidable; within limits, it is very
profitable.
Please do not feel that an answer to this letter is necessary. My
purpose is served by giving you the above information, as a basis for
consideration as you proceed with the work of revision.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
ALC:V
Fuller's next letter, dated November 25, 1940, does not address the
remedies question. Instead, he focuses on Corbin's suggestion about
publishing the casebook in two volumes.
November 25, 1940
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
This is to thank you somewhat belatedly for your letter of
November 7. I have not had time to give much consideration to the
casebook during the past two weeks, nor shall I until after the first of
the year. I'm not sure Turner told you that before the matter of the
casebook came up I had already made two commitments: one to
write a short philosophic sketch for a volume being put out by the
Northwestern people, and the other (on which I am working now) to
write an article on Consideration for the symposium to be published
by the Columbia Law Review. This article will occupy most of my
time between now and the first of the year. After that I shall go to
work in earnest on the casebook.
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It may be that it would be wise to put the book out in two
volumes, as you suggest. Frankly, I am not at all keen about the
division of contracts into two courses. I believe that the subject
matter of Contracts II, as taught at Yale and Columbia, is an integral
part of the whole subject, and is necessary to round out a picture
which is left misleading when the course stops with Consideration,
Mutual Assent, Beneficiaries, and Assignments. Furthermore, it
seems to me that the content of Contracts II is something which
should come in the first year, since it has an important bearing on
various second-year courses.
I have toyed myself several times with the idea of a different line
of division: a Contracts I course which would survey the whole field,
and then a Contracts II course which, like Havighurst's course,
would put the emphasis on special kinds of contracts: Real Estate
Broker's Contracts, Construction Contracts, Employment Contracts,
etc. Even if there were only one course and one book, the division
of chapters in the book might be along these lines.
I am writing to the West people to get a list of the men at present
using the book, and I plan to put in some of my spare time during
the next month composing a questionnaire to be sent out to the
users of the book - that is, if this plan is agreeable to you. Naturally
I would submit the questionnaire to you before sending it out. I
would try to find out what the general view was with regard to the
proper arrangement of subjects, etc. I would, of course, ask for
reactions on the proposal of two volumes.
Soon after the first of the year, I shall try to draw up a fairly
definite list of suggestions and make a trip down to New Haven to
talk them over with you. Meanwhile, it would be of great assistance
to me if you would forward to me your list of omissions, -assuming
you do omit some of the cases. Also any variations in the order of
the cases you may have found advisable.
Sincerely,
LLF:HGL

Lon L. Fuller
C. The Potentialfor DisagreementEmerges

Nearly four months passed before Fuller again wrote Corbin. As
the previous letter described, Fuller had other writing projects he had
to complete before he could devote the bulk of his time and energy to
revising Corbin's casebook. Fuller's lengthy March 26, 1941, letter,
reproduced below, indicates that he had finally turned his "full time"
attention to the casebook.
This letter is the first of the
correspondence in which Fuller seems to identify the "problem" of
"distinguishing between the work of the two editors." Although

2003]

THE CASEBOOK THAT NEVER WAS

Fuller mentions only the consideration3" material in the letter, he
states that the "introductory section" on remedies is "practically
finished." (He also vents, in a fashion not uncommon for a law
professor, about an unrelated review of one of his books that had
35
appeared recently in the Yale Law Journal.)
March 26, 1941
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I have been putting off writing you from week to week because I
could not make up my mind whether it would be better to make a
trip down to New Haven to talk to you. As things stand now, I think
it would probably be best to postpone a personal conference until
later in the year. I am now working "full time" on the casebook, but
since I have worked here and there throughout the book I have as
yet little to show for it. The new introductory section I mentioned
previously, running about 16 cases, is practically finished, with
note[s], and I have been working on Mutual Assent, Consideration,
and Assignment.
There are several specific questions I should like to put to you. In
the first place, I am very eager to cut down the length of the book,
and I am somewhat embarrassed by the fact that you use the book
for a second course at Yale, which I take it, necessitates a fairly
extensive quantity of material. As you know, we have only five
hours for contracts here, and the general tendency over the country
seems, regrettably, to be to cut down the course.
What I would like to do is to "sweat" certain sections radically by
using fairly long introductory text statements, following them with
several interesting and typical cases, of the "harder" variety, which
can serve as a basis for classroom discussion and as a means of tying
down the textual material to something concrete. This is a method I
became familiar with in using Steffan's Agency Cases and I should
like especially to use it in the following subjects: Joint Contracts,
Illegality, and the Statute of Frauds. Do you at present teach the
cases now contained in those sections? Will you let me know what
sections you "slight" and how extensive the slighting is?
Another problem I have encountered (which is aggravated by my
desire to use text specially prepared for the book) is that of
34. The second of Fuller's two articles on Contracts jurisprudence was devoted to
consideration. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799
(1941).
35. See Myres S. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An
Intervention, 50 Yale L.J. 827 (1941) (reviewing Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of
Itself (1940)).
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distinguishing between the work of the two editors. I want to carry
over a good deal, in fact most of the text which you yourself
prepared; in one case, that relating to consideration, I should like to
tie in an additional extended statement of my own. How can we
indicate editorially whose is which? I have thought about this a
good deal, and I haven't been able to find any satisfactory or
graceful solution for it. Will you pass on to me your reactions to the
problem?
I have talked to several people who have used the book and they
all think that there are too many Hohfeldian notes. I am inclined to
think that we ought either to cut down the number of these notes or
print, somewhere in the book, your article on the Hohfeldian
system. With only five hours[], I have been forced to skip over
many of the Hohfeldian problems raised in your notes, and that has
the disadvantage that it gives the student the notion that the
questions raised in the notes are generally not important. Will you
let me know how you feel about this matter, and how important
these notes are to you in your own teaching?
The final problem has to do with citations of authorities in the
footnotes. I think it would be impossible for me to bring these up to
date and retain their present form. Furthermore, the publication of
your treatise will to a large extent obviate the necessity for doing
this. What I would like to do, therefore, is to cut out "see accord...
but see contra" notes and substitute for them brief abstracts of cases
which are useful for purposes of comparison, or which will broaden
the student's conception of what can happen in the judicial process.
Is this agreeable to you?
I enjoyed reading your article in the All-Yale issue of the Journal.
Reed Powell, who is just as doubtful as ever of the Supreme Court's
competence, also thinks they probably pulled a brodie in overruling
Swift v. Tyson.
While I am on the subject of the All-Yale issue, I would like to
say something about the review of my recent book (or was it of me?)
which it contained. It is a safe guess from the style in which this
review is written that its author is not without a certain curiosity to
know what kind of impression he created. I will not burden you
with my opinion of his discussion of the issues raised by my book,
except to say that it shows the dangers which confront a good soilerosion lawyer when he ventures into legal philosophy. Nor will I
[s]ay anything about the reviewer's style, although to accuse us poor
seekers after the Right Way of indulging in "infamous thobbing"
seems a little harsh, or would seem harsh, I suspect, if I knew what
"thobbing" meant. I was a little bit more concerned with the report
which the reviewer gave of what was said in my book. In this
carefree world it is a disgraceful fact that many people form their
opinions of authors not from a reading of their books but from a
reading of reviews of those books. I had always supposed the
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existence of this negligent practice placed a certain obligation on the
reviewer - even the reviewer who was very obviously "out to do a
job" - to be reasonably accurate in reporting what the author said. I
had supposed, for example, that when the author's thought was
paraphrased, it would be better not to put the paraphrase in quotes,
since this might lead some careless reader to thin[k] that the author
had said it. Again, when the author discusses a book by Kelsen on
democracy, better practice would call for labeling the views under
discussion as those of Kelsen and not those of the American realists,
even though the latter form of statement serves the reviewer's
purpose in creating an issue between the author and the realists.
When the author says that Kelsen disagreed with the previous
positivists because they entertained a certain view, it would be
better not to attribute this view to Kelsen himself, even though
doing so suits the reviewer's purpose in creating an impression that
the author's book is all one "big, blooming, buzzing confusion."
When the author speaks of the collapse of democracy in "Germany
and Spain" it would be better to say "Germany and Spain" and not
"Germany and France," even if one found the author's thought so
confused that the substitution seemed of little importance.
From your experience in university life and your familiarity with
the course little tempests like this one are apt to take you will realize
that there are always gossips who like to give a kind of institutional
interpretation to the quarrels of the professors, as if our great
universities were swatting at one another and accusing each other of
things like "idiosyncratic myopia." In the light of this you will not
take it amiss if I report the amusement of one of my less charitably
inclined colleagues on discovering the following passage in the
review: "The record of the realists, considering their institutional
handicaps, is more impressive than is sometimes imagined."
I hope that you will not think that I am really peeved by the
review. To tell you the truth, I am more puzzled than peeved. I am
particularly puzzled because I had received a letter from my good
friend, its author, last spring asking my forgiveness "if a naturally
perverse disposition forces me to pick a few piddling quarrels with a
great book!" In a letter written just before the review appeared, he
said that the review "is rougher in terms than I had intended" and
that he hoped that "the vigor and amount of the attention I pay you
will bear full testimony to you and to others of the great respect I
bear you." I have a suspicion that there will be occasional readers
who will not detect "the great respect" implicit in the review, and
there are others who would be surprised to learn that a book which,
according to the last note in the review, is so preposterous that it is
perhaps a mistake to take it seriously, is, in the privately-expressed
opinion of its reviewer "a great book." Oh well, it was anciently said
that the devil himself knoweth not the mind of man, and I shall not
attempt to fathom this one.
Will you let me have your answer to my questions about the
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casebook as soon as possible, as I have reached the point where
some of these things have to be decided before I can go on
effectively.
Sincerely,
LLF:HGL

Lon L. Fuller

Corbin responded almost immediately to Fuller's letter. He states,
in a handwritten letter on March 28, 1941, that the casebook was to be
Fuller's, although he does allude prophetically to the possibility that
co-editors could "violently disagree" about a matter concerning a
book.
YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Professor of Law

Charlottesville, Va.
March 28, '41
Dear Mr. Fuller:
Your letter was forwarded to me here. I shall write a brief reply
in order to help you along, reserving more detailed comment for the
future.
Go ahead with your plans, without worrying about me. I have
confidence in your judgment and reasonableness (and so has
McDougal) and also in your willingness to discuss matters when they
become specific. Treat the chapters on Joint Contracts, Illegality,
and Statute of Frauds as you please. They are not my favorite
children. As now printed they are inadequate as a basis for any
synthesis of doctrine; but I have thought that first year men ought to
be given at least a bowing acquaintance with these topics. I have
frequently been unable to cover these chapters.
I am not wedded to "Hohfeldian notes." Are there really very
many of them? I give a couple of introductory lectures and then
proceed to analyze cases as I please. It is my belief that students get
most benefit out of exact analysis of facts, rather than out of my
footnotes or introductory notes.
Footnote citations render little service. Abbreviated statements
of cases are all right if clear and accurate and not too numerous.
They seem overdone in Handler's Cases on Vendor and Purchaser,
a book that I am now teaching.
Why is it necessary to distinguish in any way between your note
work and mine. It will appear in preface that it is your edition of my
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earlier book. If after discussion we should violently disagree on
something, we can deal with that as a special and horrible example.
Don't let McDougal's review trouble you. He is an able and
interesting man who is on his way. He is making intellectual
discoveries that seem very important to him. This leads him at
present to be rather assertive, critical, and dogmatic. At the same
time he is warm-hearted and friendly; and I know that he holds you
in affectionate respect. It has long been my practice to let anything
that I have published fight its own battles.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
Fuller's next letter, dated May 20, 1941, mentions that he hopes to
meet with Corbin during a trip Corbin was scheduled to make to
Cambridge. Fuller reiterates his concern about the length of the
casebook.
May 20, 1941
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I have just learned through Mr. Turner that you will be in
Cambridge next Monday. I am very eager to have a chance to talk
with you about the general scope of the casebook, though I shall try
to avoid burdening you with matters of detail. I am particularly
interested to know what the minimum requirements for your own
courses in Contracts would be since I should like to cut down the
length of the book as much as possible.
I don't know what your schedule is, of course, but if you could
stay over in Cambridge Monday night my wife and I would be
delighted to have you stay with us. I know that you always like to
have a get-together with Mr. Williston when he is here, but he seems
to be away now, and I don't know whether he will have returned by
then or not. In any event, without burdening you and without
interfering with your other plans, we want you to know that the
latchstring is out with us and we should like to have you spend as
much time as you can with us.
Sincerely yours,
LLF:HGL

Lon L. Fuller

In a November 5, 1941, handwritten letter, Corbin wishes Fuller
luck in his efforts to prune the length of the casebook, but Corbin
indicates that he does not hold out much hope that Fuller will be able
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to do it. Corbin also reminds Fuller, as he often did, to keep the
material "factually interesting" for the students.
YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Professor of Law
Nov. 5, '41
Dear Mr. Fuller:
Please send me Ms. chapter by chapter, as soon as is convenient
to you. It will be much better for me not to have a large quantity to
consider during a short time. Just now my vitality is a bit reduced by
reason of some kidney gravel that hurt like hell.
I have a notion that your chapters on "Special problems" in this
and that will reorganize the chapter on "Conditions." I have often
thought of segregating its material more specifically. In my
judgment, it is in the field of performance of contract, with its wealth
of factors unforeseen by the parties, that the most profit will be
found in segregation by trade, business, profession, etc.
I often wonder how successful you are going to be in keeping
down the total number of pages. Don't try to do too much; and be
sure to keep your material factually interesting.
With my kind regards,
Arthur L. Corbin
D. Fullerand Corbin Disagreeabout the Merits of a Remedies-First
Approach
In a November 10, 1941, letter, Fuller reaffirms his plan to begin the
casebook with remedies rather than formation. His objective is to
make the students "remedy-minded."
November 10, 1941
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
To minimize the consequences of a possible loss of any of the
manuscript, I am sending you herewith only the first chapter.
Though the cases in this chapter may seem at first to be drawn from
rather different fields of law, my intention is that they should be
discussed as a series, with each case having some relation to what
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precedes it and what follows it. Thus Clark v. Marsiglia and Hadley
v. Baxendale are qualifications on Hawkins v. McGee, qualifications
which need to be explained. I do not intend to cover the whole
problem of remedies exhaustively in this first chapter; some of the
missing parts will be picked up en route; some will be taken care of
in a later chapter on damages, following the subject of conditions.
The purpose of the first chapter is partly to make the student
"remedy-minded" (I recall in this connection your own note to the
chapter on remedies), as well as to give him that minimum of
information about remedies and damages necessary to get an
adequate perspective of the cases which intervene before a more
intensive study of remedies in a later chapter.
When you are through with this chapter, I'll send along the
chapter on mutual assent.
Sincerely,
LLF:HGL
Corbin responded on November 21, 1941, with an objection that
rings familiar to many modern ears: the remedies-first approach is too
complicated for beginning law students.
YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Professor of Law

November 21, 1941.
Professor Lon L. Fuller
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Mr. Fuller:
Along with this letter I am mailing to you your first chapter of
cases. You may remember that I expressed some doubts as to the
desirability of an introductory chapter such as this. At the same
time I recognized that it was yours to experiment.
A study of the cases in your chapter does not remove my doubts;
instead it intensifies them. While I sympathize with your wish to
make the students "remedy minded" as early as possible, it seems to
me that you are asking too much of beginners. My belief is that
their first problems should be as simple and as closely related to
their past experience as possible.
In this chapter you throw them at once into the complexities and
uncertainties of damages: liquidated and unliquidated, penalties,
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unjust enrichment, expenditures in reliance, expected gains both
speculative and otherwise.
The last six or eight cases require the analysis and comparison of
contract and quasi-contract. In my first edition I tried this on a small
scale. Among these last cases, Boo[n]e v. Coe involves the statute of
frauds and the "part performance" doctrine, as to which Kentucky is
in a small minority. The Anonymous case, p. 86, like so many oldtime reports, will puzzle the beginner, making a distinction without
discussion. The last case, p. 92, illustrates one of the rules of remedy
in land sale cases.
I can see your plan of working through this series in class; but I
believe that you will not get the results that you desire. Even for the
introductory understanding that you are working for, the students
will need more cases than you include. At the same time, you can
not expect to complete the discussion of these topics in the first
chapter.
What I have written above is of course no news to you. You must
have chosen these cases for the very reason that they involve all the
matters mentioned. My point is that even after a large amount of
explanatory lecture by you the students will remain bewildered.
Also I predict that not many other teachers will use the chapter.
My present suggestion is that you have the chapter
mimeographed, or printed, and use it in your classes next October
before the casebook is completed and bound up. Such a test may
demonstrate that I am in error. In any case I leave the final decision
to yourself.
Yours sincerely,
ALC:V

Arthur L. Corbin

Fuller offers a powerful defense of his remedies-first approach in a
lengthy November 24, 1941, letter to Corbin. Fuller draws heavily in
the letter on his seminal article on remedies.36 He acknowledges that
his proposed approach to teaching Contracts is "revolutionary," but
he asks Corbin to keep an "open mind" about it. The letter is almost
certainly the most important of the correspondence between the two
men.

36. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 31.
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November 24, 1941
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I have received a return of the first chapter and your comments
on it. As to the minor matter of M[e]ssrs. Meddle and Peel your
criticism was very much in point, and I shall try to rephrase the case
to take account of it.
As to the more important matter of the coherence and/or
teachability of the whole Chapter. I have no doubt that it will be
fairly hard going for first-year men. On the other hand, I don't think
it will be quite as hard as you imply. The first-year man is in the
fortunate position of being unaware that the materials of this section
are drawn from the diverse fields you mention. Many of the things
which disturb you I am sure will not disturb him.
Your remarks about particular cases make it clear that the
chapter does not have the continuity for you that it does for me.
Perh[ap]s it would be well for me to spell out what I am driving at in
this first chapter. I have become convinced that contract law must
be analysed in terms of what I called, in my Yale article, a hierarchy
of interests. A court may interfere where a promise is broken (1) to
prevent unjust enrichment of the promisor, (2) to reimburse the
promisee's reliance or (3) to give the promisee the value of the
promised performance. The incentives to judicial intervention to
protect these interests decrease in the order in which I have named
the interests. As to the first, courts will protect this often even in the
absence of a promise, or where the promise is oral and
"unenforceable" under the statute of frauds, etc.
To my mind the significance of these interests is written across
the whole field of contracts. For example, take two problems raised
in your very first chapter on "Inoperative Preliminary Negotiation."
The problem of the offer made in jest taken seriously by the offeree
raised the following questions: (1) If the jesting offeror is held to
"the contract" will the measure of recovery against him be the
offeree's expected profit or his losses through reliance? (2) In the
absence of "a contract," will there be any quasi-contractual
recovery? I know that it is often assumed that if any relief is granted
on the contract it must be measured by the lost profit. But I am
frank to say that I see no warrant for this either on the authorities,
or, as it used to be fashionable to say, "on principle." It seems to me
impossible to discuss whether there "ought to be a contract" without
knowing what difference that makes.
Your present

first

section

also

raises

the

problem

of
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"indefiniteness." This in turn raises the following questions: (1) Will
reliance by the plaintiff cure the objection of "indefiniteness" and
make the court willing to enforce a contract it would not enforce in
the absence of such reliance? (2) If the basis of judicial intervention
is the protection of reliance, will the measure of recovery be in terms
of reliance, or in terms of the expected profit? (There are cases both
ways.) (3) If the court declares the contract too vague to give rise to
any suit "on" it, is there a chance of quasi-contractual recovery?
In my opinion the questions I have raised about the "interest
protected" are not only important to fill out the student's knowledge
of the kinds of relief available, but must be taken into account to
understand any particular kind of relief.
I could go through the whole subject of mutual assent,
consideration (cf., § 90), conditions,[ ]impossibility, the statute of
frauds, and almost every other branch of contract law (except
perhaps joint and several contracts) and show the significance of
these interests.
I do not claim that this is an original discovery of mine. Many
writers have in discussing particular cases made distinctions along
the lines I have mentioned. I recall, for example, your own
discussion of the Cole-McIntyre case, in which you point to the
absence of any benefit received by the silent offeree. The difference
between my view and that of others is in the matter of emphasis, and
in the fact that I have developed this idea more systematically and
pervasively than have most other writers.
Naturally the general problem I have mentioned is made most
explicit in the law relating to remedies, because it exercises there a
direct and obvious influence on the measure of recovery. It is for
that reason that I like to start the subject of contracts with remedies.
I have for a number of years devoted the first hour or two of the
course to raising the questions dealt with in the proposed first
section, including that of Timmerman v. Stanley. I have found that
this enriches the subsequent discussion, and that students are not
permanently bewildered by this approach. Indeed, I have been
surprised how interested they become in the problems of "how
much," which is certainly no more remote from their previous
interests than, say, Stanton v. Dennis.
Now as to how I would teach this first section myself.
Throughout I would put the following questions: (1) Did the court
grant the plaintiff the full monetary equivalent of actual
performance? (2) If it did not, what did it actually give him? (3)
What was the rationale of the particular kind of relief it gave?
When the cases are considered in the light of these inquiries, I
submit they lose the hodge-podge character you seem to attribute to
them. Hawkins v. McGee says that plaintiff gets the monetary
equivalent of performance. Why, then, the limitations in Clark v.
Marsiglia, and Hadley v. Baxendale? Incidentally, does the student
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gain insight into the problems raised in those two cases by studying
offer and acceptance and consideration? On the other hand, do not
these limitations come up constantly in offer and acceptance? (Cf.,
Offord v. Davies, Rague v. New York Evening Post, Mott v.
Jackson, § 45, etc.)
Again, what preparation for the subject of liquidated damages
does the student get from studying offer and acceptance,
impossibility, etc.? On the other hand, is not the problem, how far
will a court go in giving the plaintiff the monetary equivalent of what
was promised him (which is involved in this subject), one which cuts
across many of the problems raised under the conventional rubrics?
I think particularly of your case on page 649.
About the two cases you mention specifically. Boone v. Coe was
a case where the defendant contracted orally to give the plaintiff a
lease on property in Texas. In reliance on the oral promise the
plaintiff moved from Kentucky to Texas, where he was not
permitted to go into possession of the premises. He sues for the cost
of moving. The court denies this recovery, but says it would have
given him a return of benefits had any been conferred on the
defendant. I would ask about this case: (1) How far does the court
go here in protecting the promisee? (2) Why did it stop where it
did? (3) Why is it more willing to compel a return of benefits than
to reimburse reliance?
You say that the case involves a peculiar Kentucky doctrine of
part performance. I don't follow this. The performance here was
not of a type to take the contract out of the statute according to §
197 of the Restatement. I know there are cases holding that the
contract is taken out by partial performance not satisfying § 197.
But why raise that question at all? It is not mentioned by the court,
and I see no reason to bring it into the discussion. My object in this
first chapter is not to teach all of the law surrounding these cases;
but to give the student an awareness of this problem of the three
interests I have mentioned, which incidentally, of course, do not
need to be called "interests."
You also mention the abstracted case, Rabinovitz v. Marcus, 100
Conn. 86. That case held that the buyer under a land contract could,
on default by the seller, recover (1) payments made and (2)
reimbursement for reliance. It was put in to be compared with
Timmerman v. Stanley, which held that a plaintiff could not sue
"on" the contract for losses through reliance, and recover benefits
conferred, since the two recoveries were inconsistent with one
another. (Incidentally, is not Hadley v. Baxendale hovering in the
background here?)
You say of the Rabinovitz case that it "illustrates one of the rules
of remedy in land sales cases," and I take it you have inferred that
that was its significance for me. I see no reason in discussing this
case to go into the problem of the conflict about the measure of
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recovery in the land cases. For me it illustrates a more general
problem, can the plaintiff get restitution of benefits and
reimbursement of reliance in one suit?
As a matter of fact Connecticut is cited by McCormick as a
jurisdiction following the loss-of-bargain rule. But even in such
jurisdictions, as the Rabinovitz case illustrates, probably the plaintiff
can restrict his demand to a reimbursement of reliance. But I see no
reason to drag all this into the discussion.
I talked yesterday with Seavey about this first chapter. He shares
your doubts about its teachability. On the other hand, he and
Thurston in their new book are including restitution in their
discussion of deceit. In other words, they have encountered exactly
the same difficulty in dealing with one aspect of deceit in isolation
from other aspects than I have encountered in contracts. I called
this to his attention. His answer was that this was only a small part
of their course. I said, "Yes, in the one branch of tort law where the
problem I am concerned with is involved, you adopt substantially
the approach I do. But the problem is written across the whole of
contract law."
When I taught Personal Property I made a reform in the course
which corresponds almost exactly to the one I propose for
Contracts. The usual order in that course is to take up first, What is
possession? and then, What are the legal consequences of
possession? I reversed this order. I was told that it would be
impossible to teach the subject this way; that students would want to
know what possession was before talking about its legal
consequences; that the problem, What is possession? was something
within the scope of their previous experience while the problem of
legal remedies and consequences was one foreign to that experience.
Yet I taught the subject this way for three years, without any of
these difficulties manifesting themselves. In my own opinion the
new order was an immense improvement over the old from the
standpoint of imparting a functional conception of legal rules.
Naturally, my experience in Personal Property does not guarantee a
similar success in Contracts. On the other hand, it has given me a
certain immunity to the cry of "impossible."
I talked yesterday with Turner and he is quite agreeable to
bringing the book out in pamphlet form. This will enable me to
adopt your excellent suggestion that the chapter be tried in practice
before being definitely incorporated in the book.
As a result of your suggestions I am also going to see to it that the
rest of the book can stand independently of the first chapter, so that
those who don't like it can leave it out. Toward this end I am
making a minor modification in the second section, on "inoperative
preliminary negotiation."
Within the next two or three days I'll send you on about half the
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subject of mutual assent, along with a typewritten list of the
materials in the second half. The entire subject is now finished, but I
don't like to entrust the whole thing to the mails at once. I'm
reasonably confident that you will feel that I am treading on more
certain ground from now on. The first chapter is indeed the only
thing which can be called "revolutionary" about my arrangement.
I'm going to try to keep an open mind about its advisability, and I
hope you will do the same.
Sincerely,
LLF:HGL
The next day, Fuller wrote a much shorter letter to Corbin. He
enclosed some of his revisions to the mutual assent chapter, but says
nothing further about remedies.
November 25, 1941
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I enclose about half the subject of mutual assent, along with a list
of the cases and notes for the remainder of the subject. I also
enclose a list of the section headings for this chapter.
I have included the three cases on mutual mistake of fact (as
contrasted with "misunderstanding" as in the Peerless case) because
I have found it very difficult to study the cases of unilateral mistake
without a background of these cases. You will notice that Jones v.
Great Northern and its notes tend to integrate the subject matter of
the section and reveal the relation between the parol evidence rule
and the problems discussed at the beginning of the section.
Sincerely,
LLF:HGL
On December 3, 1941, Corbin penned a response to Fuller's letters
of November 24 and 25. Corbin comments on Fuller's revisions to the
mutual assent material, reiterates his famous distaste for the parol
evidence rule,37 and, most important of all, acknowledges Fuller's
valiant effort in the November 24 letter to defend "your own system"
of teaching remedies first.

37. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161 (1965); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts
Private: The Quiet Revolution in ContractLaw, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 768 & n.27
(2002) ("Professor Scott D. Gerber has recently referred to Arthur Corbin as 'the
leading opponent of the parol evidence rule."').
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YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Professor of Law
December 3, 1941.
Professor L. L. Fuller
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Mr. Fuller:
I have given your manuscript on Mutual Assent a "once-over",
reading the new cases and notes and observing changes in order and
in emphasis. Of the 30 old cases that are omitted I shall miss a few:
some because they are simple and clear illustrations such as Port
Huron v. Wohlners, Carlill v. Smoke Ball Company, 3. & M. R. R.
Co. v. Bartlett; others because I usually spend some effort on their
analysis, such as Mott v. Jackson, Bishop v. Eaton, Wheeler v.
McStay, Cooke v. Oxley and Hopkins v. Racine Iron Company. It
may well be, however, that the book has had too many cases and
that your omissions are justified for reasons that include an economy
of time and space.
I have not had time or energy to consider critically either your
new arrangement of the cases or the "teachability" of the new cases.
My impression was generally good, although the opinion in
Scammell v. Ouston did not impress me very well. Also I have some
question about including the parol evidence rule in the first chapter.
I have written a chapter on that rule in my treatise; and I do not
admire its operation in the courts. It is a handy doctrine by which to
disregard flimsy and dishonest testimony. When used for more than
that it is likely to do serious injustice. The courts have frequently
disregarded it without giving it a thought. Just as in the case of your
Introductory Chapter, however, I know that it is not here your
intention to exhaust the subject.
Every teacher has personal opinions as to analysis and order of
presenting topics and cases. You are entitled to try your own
experiments along this line.
Mistake is indeed a hard subject for either analysis or synthesis. I
have not yet written my chapter on it; but I have run against it here
and there, as in Mutual Assent and Interpretation.
Your reply to my criticism of the Introductory Chapter was very
interesting. I have no doubt that, like most other people, you can
make your own system work. It is my hope that you may present
your materials in so convincing a form that others will understand
and be convinced. Your ideas about Remedies are not far removed
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from mine except in the matter of the Introductory Chapter. Our
presentation to the students may not be very different.
My brief comments on your first chapter and on specific cases in
it were inadequate. Boone v. Coe called to my mind my study of the
part performance doctrine, made subsequently to the making of the
Restatement. Section 197 of that document does not truly represent
the cases. Just as in the case of the parol evidence rule the courts
have manhandled the statute of frauds in order to prevent it from
doing serious injustice. Of course you can use the Kentucky case, or
some special land case, for your limited purpose without considering
whether or not it lays down a minority rule or even a good rule.
Your treatment of "possession," its facts and its consequences,
does no offense to my analytical notions. No doubt the term
expresses both fact and legal relation. We must continually work
from one element to the other and back again. [Usually, however, I
start with facts followed immediately with their juristic effects (substantive
rules and remedies).]

I am mailing to you simultaneously with this the manuscript of
Mutual Assent.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
ALC:V
E. The CollaborationFallsApart
Three months later, Fuller wrote to Corbin to "discontinue" their
collaboration on the casebook. He specifies a pending "fling" in
private practice as the reason and expresses the hope that a quick
resolution of World War II will permit him to return both to law
teaching and to work on the casebook. This letter was to be the last in
the series between the two men.
March 11, 1942
Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Mr. Corbin:
I have been wanting to write you for a long time, but my plans
have been so uncertain that I have put it off until I could say
something definite about the work on the casebook. The definite
thing that I now have to say is that I shall be compelled to
discontinue work on it, probably for the duration. Among the less
immediate consequences of Pearl Harbor is the fact that Harvard
now has a considerable surplus of law professors. Naturally, those
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of us who thought that we stood some chance of getting a job
elsewhere have felt a certain obligation to look about for such a
chance. While I was debating between staying here and going to
Washington, the Boston firm of Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge and
Rugg came through with an offer which I accepted on a trial basis.
According to present plans, I shall start reporting for duty with them
about the first of April.
No doubt you will be as distressed as I am to see the work
suspended. As you know, I have practically finished the whole
subject of Consideration and Mutual Assent. Certain other subjects,
especially Conditions, Assignments, and Third Party Beneficiaries, I
have outlined and put in shape to assemble rather rapidly. On those
subjects I have made a classified card index of all the cases printed
in the leading casebooks, as well as of recent cases that I have dug
out for myself.
I am writing to Mr. Turner today. My guess is that West is not
especially eager to bring out new books during the war, though it is
possible that they, like the rest of us, are trying to carry on as usual
as long as they can.
Needless to say, the interruption of this work is the most irksome
aspect of my own impending fling at law practice. My hope is that a
speedy termination of the war will permit me to pick it up again
without too much loss of momentum.
Sincerely yours,
LLF:HGL

Lon L. Fuller
III. CONCLUSION: LANGDELL'S GHOST

The war ended and Fuller resumed his law teaching career.
However, he never returned to work on Corbin's casebook. His
biographer suggests that the reason was that he "wanted to open the
book with some cases on remedies, and Corbin was not
enthusiastic."3 Indeed, in 1947 Fuller published his own casebook,
Basic Contract Law, that opened with the desired chapter.39
Curiously, though, particularly in light of Fuller's previously described
earnest efforts to persuade Corbin of the merits of opening a
Contracts casebook with remedies-an approach Fuller himself had
acknowledged in the correspondence was "revolutionary"-Fuller did
not explain why he did so in his own casebook. There was no preface,
let alone an introduction, to the book. Fuller simply began Chapter 1,
"The General Scope of the Legal Protection Accorded Contracts,"

38. Summers, supra note 24, at 123.
39. Lon L. Fuller, Basic Contract Law (1947).
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with Hawkins v. McGee-the famous "hairy hand" case about the
expectation interest.4 0
Preface or no preface, Professor Harold Shepherd published a
review of Fuller's casebook in the 1948 inaugural issue of the Journal
of Legal Education that makes clear that Fuller's organizational
innovation was not lost on him. Shepherd wrote: "How does Basic
Contract Law differ from other leading casebooks in the field? One
significant difference appears in the very first chapter. It begins on a
remedial theme ....41
More recent scholars have referred to the significance of Fuller's
innovation in even more sweeping terms. For example, three decades
after Shepherd's review, Professor Karl E. Klare characterized42
Fuller's casebook as "probably the first post-realist contracts text.
(Corbin, as noted above, is often described as one of the original legal
realists, although there is some disagreement in the scholarly
literature about the accuracy of that appellation.) 43 Klare maintained
that Fuller's bold step of opening his casebook with remedies signaled
a central message of the legal realist: "[I]t is impossible to understand
the nature of legal rights and relationships or to logically deduce
remedial conclusions from them without knowing what courts can and
actually will do to and for litigants."'
Farnsworth points out in a comprehensive article on Contracts
anthologies that Fuller's remedies-first organizational structure soon
found favor with other casebook editors. 45 Fuller himself continued
the practice in the second and third editions of his casebook.
Professor Robert Braucher, who was to serve for a time as the
Reporter on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts before an
appointment to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court caused him
to turn over that assignment to Farnsworth,' was Fuller's co-editor on
the 1964 second edition.47 Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg replaced
Braucher as Fuller's co-editor on the 1972 third edition. (Braucher
40. Id. at 1. In Fuller's October 7, 1940, letter to Corbin-the first in the series
about the casebook-Fuller had titled the chapter "The General Scope of the Legal
Protection Accorded Promissory Expectations." He mentioned that he hoped to
come up with a "less highbrow designation" for the chapter-something "less
forbidding"-but was apparently unable to do so.
41, Harold Shepherd, Book Review, 1 J. Legal Educ. 151,152 (1948).
42. Karl E. Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 876, 882 (1979) (reviewing Charles L. Knapp, Problems in Contract
Law: Cases and Materials (1976)).
43. Compare Twining, supra note 21, with Kalman, supra note 15, and John Henry
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (1995).
44. Klare, supra note 42, at 882.
45. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 1406, 1437 (1987).
46. See Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters From Arthur L. Corbin to Robert
BraucherAnnotated, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 755, 756 (1993).
47. Lon L. Fuller & Robert Braucher, Basic Contract Law (2d ed. 1964).
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was appointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1970
and was therefore unable to participate in the third edition.)48
The long-awaited third edition of Corbin's casebook was published
in 1947 4 9-with Corbin as the sole editor-the same year as the first
edition of Fuller's casebook. Almost certainly, then, it was the
fundamental difference of opinion over whether to open their planned
joint casebook with remedies that caused these two giants of
American legal education to go their separate ways. Interestingly,
Corbin, like Christopher Columbus Langdell" and Samuel Williston"
before him, had included nothing on remedies in the first edition of
his casebook, published in 1921.52 He added a chapter on the subject
to the second edition, published in 1933," 3 but as the correspondence
detailed above makes plain, he did not open the edition with it. In the
third edition-the one on which Fuller had agreed to serve as coeditor-Corbin "cut down" significantly on remedies (omitting
entirely any cases on restitution and specific performance).54 Corbin
published a supplement in 1953 to the third edition,5 5 but the casebook
was not issued in a fourth edition.
Fuller's casebook, in contrast, continues to be reissued. Amazingly,
though, the 1981 fourth edition of the book-the first without Fuller's
active participation (he died in 1978)-dropped the remedies-first
organizational approach for which the book was famous. 56 Eisenberg
justified the reorganization in terms Corbin would have known and
loved: "[T]he new organization reflects a pedagogical judgment-that
the policy issues presented by consideration tend to be more
accessible to students just beginning law school than the issues raised
by remedies, which are often technically complex and laden with
special economic implications."5 7 The sixth, and most recent, edition
of Fuller's casebook (Fuller's name is still listed first) continues the
practice adopted in the fourth. 8
The significance of Fuller's own casebook abandoning Fuller's

48. Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law xiii (3d ed.
1972).
49. Arthur L. Corbin, Cases on the Law of Contracts: Selected from Decisions of
English and American Courts (3d ed. 1947).
50. Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of
Contracts: With References and Citations (1871).
51. Samuel Williston, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (1903).
52. Arthur L. Corbin, Cases on the Law of Contracts: Selected from Decisions of
English and American Courts (1921).
53. Arthur L. Corbin, Cases on the Law of Contracts: Selected from Decisions of
English and American Courts (2d ed. 1933).
54. Corbin, supra note 49, at viii.
55. Arthur L. Corbin, Supplement to Cases on the Law of Contracts: Selected
from Decisions of English and American Courts (3d ed. Supp. 1953).
56. Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law (4th ed. 1981).
57. Id. at XVI.
58. Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law (6th ed. 1996).
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organizational innovation was not lost on Contracts teachers. SUNYBuffalo law professors Alfred S. Konefsky, Elizabeth B. Mensch, and
John Henry Schlegel went so far as to publish an "In Memoriam"
piece on the matter in the Buffalo Law Review. They wrote:
[Fuller's decision] to break radically with tradition and begin a
contracts casebook not with formation and consideration, but with
remedies, was a powerful message that he had accepted, if only in
part, the realists' critique of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century doctrinal universe.... In this important way Fuller's book
came to signify the digestion of realism in the academy. We were all
realists then ....
Eisenberg's decision to begin with formation rather than remedies
reveals a subtle acceptance of the recent neo-formalist shadows as
reality. We can be influenced without understanding where we are
being led. That is what separated Lon Fuller from59 most law
teachers-most of the time he knew where he was going.
Many pages in the nation's law reviews have been filled criticizing
legal formalism: the scientific theory of law6" that Dean Langdell
attempted to put into practice at Harvard Law School in the late
nineteenth century.
Langdell's pedagogic philosophy was fully
embodied in his landmark casebook, A Selection of Cases on the Law
of Contracts.61 His objective was to train law students to derive "the
few, ever-present, and ever-evolving and fructifying principles, which
constituted the genius of the common law"'62 and he believed that
compiling
the critical cases in a book was the best way to accomplish
3
it.

6

No less a figure than Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. regarded
Langdell's approach as ultimately doomed to irrelevance.' Indeed, in
a scathing review of the second edition of Langdell's casebook,
Holmes referred to Langdell's formalist approach as a species of
"theological" speculation. 65 "The life of the law has not been logic,"
Holmes famously wrote, "it has been experience., 66 However,
Holmes went on to concede the usefulness of Langdell's casebook as a
59. Alfred S. Konefsky et al., In Memoriam: The Intellectual Legacy of Lon
Fuller, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 263,263-64 (1981).
60. See, e.g., David Dudley Field, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science
(address at the opening of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Sept. 21,
1859), in 1 Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field
517 (Abram Pulling Sprague ed., 1884).
61. Langdell, supra note 50.
62. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 531 (1973).
63. Langdell, supra note 50, at v-vii.
64. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Review, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1880),
reprinted in Law and Philosophy: An Introduction with Readings 106 (Thomas W.
Simon ed., 2001).
65. Id.; see generally Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the
Law of Contracts: With a Summary of the Topics Covered by the Cases (2d ed. 1880).
66. Holmes, supra note 64, at 106.
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method of preparing students for the legal profession. He concluded
his review as follows:
But it is to be remembered that the book is published for use at a
law school.... A professor must start with a system as an arbitrary
fact, and the most which can be hoped for is to make the student see
how it hangs together, and thus to send him into practice with
something more than a rag-bag of details. For this purpose it is
believed that Mr. Langdell's teachings, published and unpublished,
have been of unequaled value.67
Grant Gilmore, author of The Death of Contract,68 once
characterized Langdell as "an essentially stupid man who, early in his
life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the
tenacity of genius., 69 Although Langdell's "great idea" was the
casebook itself, rather than a particular organizational approach to a
Contracts casebook, it is interesting to note that Langdell opened his
Contracts book with formation.7 ° As the fate of Fuller's remedies-first
casebook suggests-recall that post-Fuller editions of Fuller's book
have dropped the remedies-first organization scheme-perhaps
Langdell had it right from the start. Corbin seemed to think so.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 107.
Gilmore, supra note 22.
Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 42 (1977).
Langdell, supra note 50.
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APPENDIX
REPRODUCTION OF ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE
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Notes & Observations

THIS AGREMNT,
of June

made in

triplicate this....

A.D. 1940, by and between Arthur L. Corbin

of New Haven,

Connecticut,

and Lon L.

Fuller of

COmbrid-e, M.assachusetts,
Parties of the first part (hereinafter called the authors)
and

,est Publishing Company,

of St.

Prnil, 1.innenota, party

of the second part (hereinafter called the publisher)
,IT1JESSETH
1.

THAT:

Agreements by Authors.
To prepare a cazebook on the subject of Contracts
to be kno% n as Corbin and Fuller's Cases on Contracts, containing about 1200 pares of text in the
typography of the American Casebook Series, for the
use of teachers and students in law schools, conformin:: to the style of treatment and arrangement of the
m.erican Casebook Series.
4ill prepare their manuscript in printed or typew'ritten form and deliver the complete inanuscript
of said casebook to the publisher on or before the
first day of Octoberr 1941, said manuscript to be
satisfactory to the publisher. Manuscript is to be
prepared by said Fuller and to be submitted to said
Corbin, Fuller's decision to be final in case of any
differences subdett only to Judgment of Warren A.
Seavey, General Editor of American Casebook Series.
To cite both the various units of the National
Reporter System and the State Reports to each case
authority, so that the work may be equally usable
with the Reporters or State Reports.
To cite only primary authorities, i.e. the adjudicated cases, and not refer to compilations of authorities such as digests, encyclopedias, etc., except as occasionally incident to other primary authorities. The above is not intended to exclude the
citation of law review articles and notes.
To submtt, as soon as conveniently possible, a fair
sample of manuscript in reasonably complete form for
publisher's examination and suJgestions.
_?ill not use, in the preparation of said work, any
material, the copyright of which is not owned by the
publisher, or for which the authors or publisher have
not received a license authorizing said use.
As soon as said manuscript has been accepted by the
publisher and put into type, will read and revise
the proofs as rapidly as furnished and will do all
usual and necessary things to expedite publication
of the work.

vill
prepare a subject matter index under an
alphabetical arrangement.
Except as provided below, will not edit, prepare
or publish, under their own name or otherise, or
allow to be prepared or published, under their
ovwn name, any work-which may injure or interfere
with the sale of said casebook.
',7ill pay any costs in excess of fifty dollars for
making alterations in copy recuested by them after
same hs been set in type.
2.

A.reenents by Publisher.
Upon receipt and acceptance of said manuecript,
to put it into type promptly and to provide authors
with proofs promptly for reading, checking, and indenAi;.
To provide r-l paper, stationery, etc., usual to
such undertakings, as authors may require to compiete the work.
To provide, in the form of signatures from the
!iational Reoorter System, or photoctatic copies,
any caseE that the authors may require for the text
of thelr ca ebook.
.ill
pay to authors, in consideration of said
completed manuscript, a royaltyy in the amount of
18 Y5 of the net selling price on all books sold
said royalty to be divided as follows: 6% to
Arthur L. Corbin and 12% to Lon L. Fuller.
Will render' to authors an accounting upon sales
and royalties and pay all accrued royalties the
first
day of February and AuruEt, yearly.
To prepare, without expense to authors,
of Cases for said work.

a Table

Will supply authors, promptly upon publication,
with 8 copies each of said work, without charge.
3.

Miscellaneous Agreements.
Nothik4; herein contained shall be construed as
preventing the publisher from publishing another
work on the same subject.
Copyright of said work shall be taken out in the
name of the 'est Publishing Company.
Style of caid work, as well as number of volumes)
price, distribution, advertising, etc., shall be
decidled by the publisher.
In case a new edition, revision or supplement
to said work shall become necessary, publisher
shall have the option of publishing same.

At the end of five yeare from date of publication
of the above casebook sald :lest ?uhlishin: Company
agreo
to arrange: for the publ.ication of n new edition
of cand cwneoek .hich ehall be in the naroe of said
Pull.r,
the royalties o;n such edition to oe ",
aid to
said Fuller and to be not less thjn the royalties on
this
edition now paid to Corbin and rIuller, or in the
alternative, if it does not then desire to publish a
new edition, to penalt sald Foller to publish a casebook on the subject using such material of the present
bnok as he sees fit.
h
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October 7, 1940

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I have been intending to write you for a long time to
give you a report on my work on the third edition of your casebook, but had delayed until I could furnish a fairly definite
Naturally i want to take just as large an advanprospectus.
tage as I can of your counsel; on the other hand, I understand
perfectly that the real labor of the revision is mine, and that
because of your work on your treatise you donut want to be
bothered with details. I don't know as yet how we can best
work together. If you would like for me to do sop I shall be
glad to make a trip down to Dew Haven sometime in the course of
the winter so that we can talk over the whole matter. Or would
you prefer for me to send along to you the individual chapters
as I get them ready?
By the way of purely "Inoperative Preliminary Negotiation"
I should like to list the principal changes I would like to
introduce into the book. These are naturally in addition to
the substitution of new cases for some of those in the book,
changes in order, etc. I list these changes in the approximate
order of their importance to me, i.e., in the order of tuacir
importance from the standpoint of my own use of the book in
class.
(1) 1 should like to introduce a new introductory section
running about 15 cases, to be entitled something likei "The General Scope of the Legal Protection Accorded Promissory Expec(I would prefer a less highbrow designation for this
tancies."
chapter; perhaps something less forbidding will suggest itself
This section would deal with the Droblem of enforcement
later.)
I have worked out the detaiie of the chapter
in general terms.
pretty well, and if you 'ould like I would be glad to send you
a list of the oases I want to include, and some indication of
the character of the notes. My object in this section will be
to bring home to the student the fact that back of the question,
"Is there a contract?" there always lies a more specific problem of enforcement. I believe that the cases I have selected
are also sufficiently simple, and stand sufficiently on their
own feet, so that this first section can also serve to introduce him to the problem of abstracting and analysing cases
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generally. I should include cases illustrating in very general qerms the various measures of recovery for breach of con-

tract, illustrating what might be called a"qualified enforcement"
such as New York gives the contract to pay an attorney's fee.
I should also include Clark v. Marsiglia (or T7igent v. Marrs)
and Hiadley v. azxendale to illustrate the limits on enforcement.
(I find it very difficult discuss Offord v. Davies and Rague v.
Tew York E-0-ning Post iw-ithout the principle of mitigating damarres.)
At the end of the chapter I should insert a note on
specific performance.
This chapter would incidentally take up
the problem of indefinite contracts, and show how restitution
would be granted generally no matter how vague the contract,
that what I call "the reliance interest" would, in case the
contract were a little more definite receive either direct
(see Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181 or indirect (see '1orris
v. Fsallard) recognition, and that the courts would be least
inclined to protect the expectancy,
(2)
I should like to insert at the beginning of the section on consideration a rather long textlial analysis of the
problem of consideration and the seal, which would be p-tly
based on the present introductory notes, but which in part
would go considerably beyond then.
(3)
As a part of the same scheme, I should like to cut
down the present section on sealed contracts, substituting
text for a good many of the cases, and move the whole section
up between the proposed new note on consideration and the seal
and the cases on consideration. (I have taught the thing this
way now for about five years.)
(4) I should like to introduce into the section on "Reliance
on a Promise as Considerationd three cases on estoppel in pais,
which will serve to bring out the relation between "promissory
estoppel" and"estoppel in pais," and will also illustrate the
problem of the measure of relief to be granted.
(5) I should like in various places (particularly in the
chapter on Assignment) to substitute an introductory note on the
history of the subject for the older cases now included. This
is, of course, siiply in order to save time. (As you perhaps
know, we have only five hours for con .racts here, and the tendency over the country as a whole seems to be to cut down the
time allowed for the subject.)
(6)
Though I have no very definite opinion about the
matter as yet, I am inclined toward moving the chapters on
Asoignment and Beneficiaries toward the niddle of the book.
From the standpoint of correlating contracts with other firstyear courses, partiouoarly agency, I believe that an arrangement
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which ta-es up these subjeots at an earlier time i2 better.
.7)

I should like

to include a short section on the parol

evidence rule.
This seems, as one glanaces over it, a rather formidable
only a smasl nortion of the
list,
but it affects, after all,
total work. iaturally all of these plans are tentative, and
the help and advice I can from you before
I want to get all
Particularly I should like to
reaching any definite decisions.
to kno.-w what chanr:-es you would consider desirable, other than
those I have mentioned.
I have thought so'le of sending out a questionaire to those
now using the book, asking them for suggestions. ';;hat do you
think of the idea?
If the proposals I have enumerated are too extensive to
make it con.venient for you to discuss them in a letter, and
you would profer for me to come down to see you before goinrg t
to ork on them, please let me now. On the other hand, if
they meet with your approval in a general way, I ",would be glad
if you would say so, as i would then feel fairly confident in
going aEhead with the acutal work of wxlting the n(Mes, abridging the cases, eto.
Sincerely yours,

LLF :RGL
?.S. If in your use of the casebook in class you have
I should
worked out a scheme of omissions or rearangements
like to have a copy as soon as possible.

YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECICUT
ARThUR L CORBIN
?ROIMOZ
OFLAW

November 7, 1940.

Professor Lon L. Fuller
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Mr. Fuller:
Here at Yale, I am now compelled to teach the subject of
"Contracts" in two parts:
- '
Contracts I in about 60"class-room hours of the Fir!,t year;

Contracts II in about 45 hours of the Second year.
This has led me to subdivide the materials as follows,
probably somewhat as you have Yourself been doing:
Contracts I
Mutual Assent
Consideration
Seal
Discharge
dParties(Beneficiaries
(Assignees
Toint and Several
Contracts II
Operative Iffect of Contract
(being the character and limits of the rights
duties, powers, etc., that are oonsecuant upon

a contract)
Interpretation
Constructive Conditions

Impossibility and
other like factors
Repudiation (and other Breaches
Iudicial Remedies
Damages
Restitution
Spec. PerfoimanceIllegality
Statute of Frauds

Anticipatory, etc.)

I write this to suggest the possibility of publishing the
new ediiion in two seperate and somewhat smaller volumes, at least
for such schools as would like to divide the subject into two courses.
For other schools it would still be possibl5 to bind the material in

a single volme.

Professor Lon L. Fuller
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Perhaps this would make desirable a very moderate expansion
of the material dealing with Judicial Remedies. Even in a school
that offers such separate courses as Damages, Quasi Contracts, and
Specific Performance, the students can seldom elect them all.
I feel strongly that in all schools, the Remedies available
for enforcement should be considered along with the other parts of
Contract law. Without doubt, the same may be said of Property and Torts.
i do not go so far as to include Court Procedure. There is much overlapping that is unavoidable; within limits, it is very profitable.
Please do not feel that an answer to this letter is necessary.
My purpose is served by giving you the above infonation, as a basis for
consideration as you proceed with the work of revision.
Yours sincerely,

ALC :V

November 25, 1940

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Oomiecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
This is to thahk you soreehat belatedly for your letter of
November 7. I have not had tire to give much consideration to the
casebook during the past two weeks, nor shall I until after the
first of the year. im not sure Turner told you that before the
matter of the casebook came up 1 hid already made two couiitinents;
one to write a short philosophic sketch for a volume being put out
by the Northwestern people, and the other (on which i am working
now) to write an article on Oonsideration for the synzvosim to be
published by the Columbia Law Review. This article will occupy
most of riy time between now and the first of the year. After tlat
I shal go to work in earnest on the casebook.
It may be that it would be wise to put the book out in two
volumes, as you suggest. F-ankly, I am not at all keen about the
division of contracts iito two courses. I believe that the subject matter of Contracts 11, as taught at Yale and Columbia, is
an integral part of the whole subject, and is necessary to round
out a picture whi.b is left misleading ahen the course stops with
Consideration, L.tual Assent, Beneficiaies, and Assignments. Furthermre, it seems to me that the content of Contracts Il is something which should come in the first yeax, since it has an Important bearing on varlous second-yeazr courses.
I have toyed myself several times with the idea of a different line of division: a Contracts I course vhich would survey the
whole field, and then a Contracts II course fich, like Xavighust's
course,, ould put the emphasis on secial kinds of ocntracts: Reel
Estate Brokex's Contracts1 Construction Contracts, lE-loyment Contracts, etc. Even if the.e were only one course and one book, the
division of chapters in the boot might be alonrg these lines.
I az writing to the West people to get a list of the men at
present using the book, and I plan to put in some of my snare time
during the next wonth coosTia a raestionaire to be sent out to
the users of the book - that is, if this plan is agreeable to you,
Naturally I would subrit the cuestionaire to you before sending it
out. I would try to fin4 out what the general view was with regard
to the proper arrangement of subjects, etc. I would, of course,
ask for reactions on the proposa1 of two volumes.

Professor AIthu' L. Corbin
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Soon after the first of the year, I shall try to draw up a
fairly definite list of shggestions and make a trip down to
New Haven to talk them over with you. Meanwhile, itwould be of
great assistance to me ifyou would forvard to me your list of
omissions, --assuming? you do omit some of the cases. Also any
variatione in the order of the cases you may have found advisable.
Sincerely,

LLFIIT:IGL

Lon L. Fuller

Iarch ?Z, !Al
M

Prof e500r Ar.1nur1 . Corbin
Yale University Law School
New Hlaven, Connecticut
Dear Profeosor Corbin:
.ve been
,utting
off rting you from week to week because
I oould not u:a e u my mind whether it wouid bc bette - to nake a
trio do.wn to Nfew 1faven to talk to you. As things snd now, I think
it ,ou.ld probably be best to postpone a ,-,rsonal conference tl
time" on the cnsebook,
later in the year. 1 am now orkingi'fll
but since I have worked here Lnd their throui.hout the book I have
as yet little to show for it. The new introductory section I mentioned previously, running about 16 cases, is practioally finished,
with note ; and I .ave been working on 1.utual Assent, Consideration,
and Asei:rL~tent.
There are several specific questions I should like to "Out to
you. In the first placeT an very eaier to. cut dowm the length
of the book, and I an solevat embarrassed by the fact that you
use the book for a second course at Yale, which I take it, necessitates a fairly extensive quantity ;of material.. As you know, we
have only flve hours for contracts here, a-d -thengeneral tendency
over the country waems, xegretatlyto be to cut -on. the o ae.

Mha~t I ;7idd like -to do 17s to sr-etl cerzatt sactionr, wad, followoaiiy Oy Alzi-g !ailly icng introctory text stateme
a. ca s. of "e "harder
-sereral
inereatng and
s wh
ing
om discesmion and
i
varietyw.
zhoh. mn. erne ai a assis fox cla

as a. mean of tyinmg dmwn the teztual material to someth-in-g conrete,
This is a method I becane fawiia= itl in lsing Steff=na Ageny
Oases .md I zhould like emecialiv to use it in the followln; suab*ects: Joit Contract, Ille
Iyl. ad the - atute of Frauds.
ed in those eecmions?
Do yoU at-present teach the cases now con
d hpw eens Tr
il you let me know what setions you slh,Another probien 1 have encouttered Nwhich la arvated -y my
desi:e to use tezt secially, prepared for the 'onk) i that Of
distinguishin tetween the wrk of the two editor nwnt
, i
to
carry over a good.deal, in fact most of the t et Tnich you yourself n-r,-. ; i,n one. ease that rejating 0 Oom-ideratiojr I should
How
like to tie in wn additional extemded statement of my an.
can re indicate editorially whose. Is which? i hve t.-_ht about
this a good deal, and I hav ent been able to find anry stiefactory
or gTracef'i sokLtion for it. Will you pass on to me your~reaotions to the problem?

Professor Artku L. Corbin
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I have talked to several people who have user! the book: amc.
they all think that there are too -any Hohfeldian notes. I am
inclined to think that we ought either to aut dowu the number of
these notes or print, somehere in. the book. yoar artiCle on the
Hohfeldimn system. With only five ho.usO, I have been forced to
over marny of the 1Iohfeldie
n problerns raiseu in yomr nozes,
and
!ms
h-a-the disadvantare that it gives the otudent the notion
that the auest ions ra ed in the notes are .enerally not important.
,ll you 'et Me 1mow how you feel about this m.atter, and how impel
tenit these notes are to you in zur ovn teaching.?
The final roblei has to do with citations of authorities in
the footnotes.
I think it woulI be i~mossible for me to brin
these up to date and retain their present form. Purthermore, the
oublication of youx treatise will to a lar:-e e:ztent obviate the
necessity for doin this. Wihat I would like to do, therefore, is
to cut out "see accord
I..ut
see contra" notes and substitute
for ther, brief ai~otracts of ca:es which are useful for purposes
of conparieon, or which will broaden the ,!tudent's concetion of
what can happen imnthe judicial process. is this agreeable to you?
i enjoyed reading your article in the All-Yale issue of the
,o-oumma_.
Reed Powell, who is just as doubtful as ever of the
-upreme ourt' competence, also thinks they probably pulled a
brodie in overrulintT- Swift v. Tyson.
hile I arm on the subject of the All-Yale issu-. I would like
to say something about the review of my recent book (or was it of

me?) whieh it or-nt-ined-

It is a safe gaess fram the style in

vhich this isview is mzitten that its aathoz ist -- t mdtZ a aertain
cariosi
to know what kind of impesion he created. I willI not
burden you. ath my oniniou of his discusssion of 'the isues raised
by my booL. elcept to eay that It shows the dangers vti-h confront
a Food _oll-erosion lawyer Vhen he ventures into legal philosoph7.
NOT viI
1 way anything about the reviewier s style althou& to
accuse us poor seekers afte: the Right gay of ind
in,
s-- in
mous thobbing"" seems a l
e harsh or wnld seem harsh 1 suspoect, if i know what "'thobbing" meant. I vms a little
bit more
concerned with the reporzt which the reviewave of what was said
in my book, In this cazefree vorld it is a disgrraceful fact that
Mrny People form their opinions of authors -not from a reading of
their books but from a reading of reviews of those books. I had
alays supposed the axistence of this neglisent practice placed a
certain obli.ation on the reviewer - even the reviewer who was
very obviously gout to do a JobO - to be reasonably accurate in
reporting what the author said. I had supposed, for exemle, that
when the author's thought was paraphrased, it would be better not
to p-ut the paraphrase in quotes, since this mi nt lead Some careless reader to thna that the author had said it.
gain, when the
author discusses a uook by Kelsen on deiocracy, better praotice
would call for labelling the views under discussion as hose of

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
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Kelsen and not those of the Ahnerican realisto, even thou ,;h the
latter form of statenent serves the reviewer's nuose in 1 .eating
an iisue betwcen the author and the realists. -hnen the authIor Says
that Kelsen disagreed with the previous positivists because they
entertaind a certain view, it .qou d be setter not to attribute
this vie-., to Keelsen hi?,:self, even though doin7 co suits the reviewer's
pupose Mn creating an impression that the author's book is all
one "big, bloorsinr, buzziar confusion.11 Then the author speaks of
the collapse of denooracy in fGernn, an d Spain" it rould be :etter
to say " ermany and Spain" azd .otI'I erny and France, e,.n if
o:- Found tne autor-I5 thought so confused that the substitution
seoee of little imortanee.
P~o!-. ,our e:nerience in university life win you:, Itn1.it
teroe, .ts like this one are ant to take you
with
COOLsC little
00e
will r. alize that there are always os:ipo ,.o like to -ive a kind
of institutionsl interpretation to tie quarrels of the professors,
L.Fs if our great Uiversities were Eattinr? at one another and
accuzrin.- e-ch other of thinna like Iidiosyncratic myopia." in
the !ii-31t of this you will not take it a-4os if I reoort the amseo
o o f my less chritably inclined colleagues on discovermert
ipn, the followine, passa :,a. Ii the review: "The record of ie real.
..
c r institutional handicans, is ;ore i ,pressive
ist32 c.......I.
than is sometizes imagined. "
I hope that you *-1l not think that I am really peeved by the
review.
To tell you te trnth9 I am more puzzled then peeved. I
am particularly p-zzied because I had received a letter from my

good friend, its author, z-st spring asking wy forgliveness "if a
to nick a few piddling
natural
perverse d-isnositiaona-fees..e
quarrels with a great uook!" In a letter bTitten just before the
reviaw appeared., he said that the review "is rougher in terms tban

I had intended9 a-A that he hoped thet "the vigor pma a ount of

the attention I P&y you will bear foull testimony tu you and to
I have a suspiclon that
other.- o the great respect I beax you.
there wI! be occasiona'l reade-s +ho vil. not detect "the great
respectl implicit in the raiew, and the2re are others wao -.ouLd
be surprised to lea-n that a oook which. according to the lest
a misis
note in the review. is so preposterous that it Werhans
take to take it seriously, is, in the privately--expressed opinion
of its Xeviewsr .agreat. bock.f Ch jell, it ,..as ancientl y maid
that the devil himself knoweth not the mind of nan, and I shall
to fatnom thin one.
riot atta
Will you let me have your answer to my cpestlons ;hout the
casebook as soon as possible, as I have reached the point where
some of these things have to be decided before I can L0 on effvect ively.

LLF : GL

Lon L. Fuller
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May 20, 1941

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Ccrbin:
I have just learned through Mr. Turner that
I am bery
you will be in Cambridge next honday.
eager to have a chance to talk with you about
the general scope of the casebook, though I shall
try to avoid burdening you with matters of detail.
I am particularly interested to know what the
minimum requirements for your own courses in
Contracts would be since i should like to cut down
the length of the book as much as possible.
I don't know vhat your schedule is, of course,
but if you could stay ovex in Cambridge Monday night
my wife and I would be deligbted -o have you stay
with us. I kne that you always like to have a gettogether with JFr. Tilliston when he is here, but he
seems to be way now, and I dant )mcw whether be
In any event,
rill
have returned by then or not.
without burdening you and without 1nte-feri= with
your other plans1 we -want you to know that the
latchstring is out with us and we should like to
have you sDend as =Ceh time as you can with us.
Sincerely yours,

LLr:HGL

Lon L. Fuller

YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW
HAVEN,
CONNECTICUT
ARTHUR
LCODIN

4
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19i

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Coxbin:
To minimize the consequences of a poossible loss
of any of the manuscript, I am sending you herewith
only the first chapter. Though the cases in this
chapter may seem at first to be drawn from r--,ther
different fields of law, my intention is that they
should be discussed as a series, with each case having some relation to what precedes it and what follows it. Thus Clark v. Ursiglia and Hadley v.
Baxendale are qualifications on Hawkins v. 1.c&ee,
qualifications which need to be explained. I do not
intend to cover the whole problem of remedies
exhaustively in this first chapter; some of the
missing parts will be picked up en route; some will
be taken care of in a later cbaptez on damages, following the subject of conditions. The purpose of
chapter is partly to make the studen
the first
"xemedy-minded" (I recall in this connection your own
note to the chapter on remedies), as well as to give
him that miI-MUM of information about remedies and
damages necessary to get an adecuate perspective of
the cases which intervene before a more intensive
study of remedies in a later chanter.

Rhen you are throUgh with this chapter, I'll
send along the chapter on mutual assent.
Sincerely,

LLF: HGL

YALE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
NEW HAVEN,CONNECTICUT
L CORBIN
ART'.HUR

November 21, 1941.

Professor L. L. Fuller
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Mr. Fuller:
Along with this letter I am mailing to you your first chapter of
cases. You may remember that I expressed some doubts as to the desirability
of an introductory chapter such as this. At the same time 1 recognized that
it was yours to experiment.
A study of the cases in your chapter does not remove my doubts;
instead it intensifies them. While I sympathize with your wish to make the
students "remedy minded" as early as possiole, it seems to me that you are
asking too much of beginners. My belief is that their first problems should
be as simple and as closely related to their past experience as possible.
In this chapter you throw them at once into the complexities and
uncertainties of damages: liquidated and unliquidated, penalties, unjust enrichment, expenditures in reliance, expected gains both speculative and otherwise.
The last six or eight cases require the analysis and comparison of
contract and quasi-contract. In my first edition I tried this on a small
scale. Among these last casesBoome v. Coe involves the statute of frauds
and the "part performance" doctrine, as to which Kentucky is in a small minority. The Anonymous case, p. 86, like so many old-tiue reports, will puzzle
the beginner, making a distinction without discussion. The last case, p. 92,
illustrates one of the rules d remedy e' land sale cases.
I can see your plan of working through this series in class; but I
believe that you will not get the results that you desire. Even for the introductory understanding that you are working for, the students will need more
cases than you include. At the same time,you can not expect to complete the
discussion of these tonics in the first chapter.
'hat I have written above is of course no news to you. You must
have chosen these cases for the very reason that they involve all the matters
mentioned. Mypoint is that even after a large amount of explanatory lecture
by you the students will remain bewildered. Also I predict that not many other
teachers will use the chapter.
My present suggestion is that you have the chapter mimeographed, or
printed, and use it in your classes next October before the casebook is completed and bound up. Such a test may demonstrate that I am in error. In any
case I leave the final decision to yourself.
Yours sincerely,
ALC
:V

Bovembez 24, 1911

Professor Arthur Li Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Cor'in:
I have received a return of the first chapter and your
comments on it. As to the minor matter of Mssrs. teddle and
Peel your criticism was very much inDoint, and i shall try
to rephrase the case to take account of it.
As to the more important matter of the coherence and/or
teachability of the whole Obater. I have no doubt that it
will be fairly hard going for first-year men. Or the other
hand, I don't think it will be cuite as hard as you iMply.
he first-year sMan is in the fortunate position of being unaware that the materials of this section are drawn from the
diverse fields you mention. ,Mny of the thins hich disturb
you i am sure will not disturb him.
Your remarks about pazL c-l cases make it clear that
the chapter does not have the continuity for you that it does
for me. Perhpas it would be well for me to spell out what i
am driving at in this first chater. I bave become convinced
that contrct law must be analysed in terms of what I called,
in my Yale article, a hierarchy of Interests. A court may
interfere aere a promise is broken (1) to prevent unjust
enrichment of the prom-'sor, (2) to reimburse the promisce's
reliance or 3) to give the promisce the vabie of the promised
performance. The Incentives to judicial Intervention to protect these interests decrease in the order in which I have
named the interests. As to the first, courts will protect
this often even in the absence of a Dromise, or vhere the Dromise is oral and "unenforceable' under the statute of frauds,
etc.
To my mind the significance of these interests is w-ritten
across the whole field of contracts. For =-nnle, tae tD
problems raised in your very first chapte: on 'Inoperative
Preliminary Negotiation.' The problem of the offer de in
jest taken seriously by the offeree raised the following cuestions: (i)if the jesting offeror is held to Pthe contact'
ill the measare of recovery against hin be the offereets
ezrected profit or his losses through re1i!aoe7 (?) in the
absence of "a contmct," will there be any quasi-contractual
recovery? i knor that it is often askmed that if any relief

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
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is granted on the contract it must be measured by the lost
Profit. hut I am frank to say that i see no warrant for this
either on the authorities, or, as it used to be fashionable
to say, flon
principle.2 it seems to me impossible to discuss
whether there "ought to be a contract" without knowing what
difference that makes.
Your oresent first section also raises the oroblemr of
This in trn raises the following questions:
(i) ill reliance by the plaintiff cure the objection of "indefiniteness" and make the oourt wiliing to enforce a contract
it would not enforce in the absence of such relience? (2)if
the basis of judicial intervention is the protection of reliance,
will the neastue of recovery be in terms Of reliance, or in
teru:s of the expected profig? (There are cases both !Nays.)
(3) if the court deieoas tle contract ti-o vague to give rise
to any suit .Oon' it, is there a chance of quasi-contractual
recover?

lindefiniteneosa.

inmy coinion the questions
"interest protected" are not only
dent's laoowledge of the kindf of
taken into accoiunt to understand

I have :aised about the
ifnportant to fill out the sturelief arailable, but aunt be
any oarticular kind of relief.

I could go throu;h the whole subject of mutual assent,
consideration (of., §90), conditions~i.ossibility, the statate
of frauds, end almost every other branch of contract law (except
perhaps koint and severa contracts) and show the significance
of these interests.
i do not claim that this is an originl discovery of mine.
Bny writers have in discuss:ic particular cases made distinctions along the lines I have mentioned. I recall, for ez-aple,
your own1
discussion. of the Gole--aintyre cave, in which you
point to the absence of any benefit received by the silent of-

feree. The difference between my view and that of others is
in the mater of emphasis, and in the fact that I bave developed
this idea more systematical!y and pervasively than have most
other iriters.
Naturally the general problem I have mentoned is made
most ezlicit in the law relatin4 to remedies, because ii exercises there a direct and obvious influence on the measure of
rcovery, it is for that re.son that I like to start the subject of contracts with remedies. I hve for a number of years
devoted the first hour or tWo of the course to raising the questions dealt with in the proposed first section. includinf that
of Ti Merman v. Stanley. I have found that this enriches the
subsequent discussion, and thlat students are not permanently
berildered by this approach. Indeed, I have been suprised how
interested they become in the rblems of "how much," which is

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
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certainly no more remote from their previous interests than,
say, S+anton v. Dennis.
iiow as 'oIow i iould teach this first secto " yself.
Th-,u-hou I would Lut the fo!lowiw Q-uestions: (i)Did the
court rant the nlintif: the full nonetry ecuivalent of actua l:-efo nce? k3) If itdid not, ,hat did "tactuial:v -ie
jinm(,) That was the rationale of the narticular kind of
relief it:iave? Then the cae¢;s are considered in the lihit of
thesc anuzerie
submit they lose the hodt-podge character
z that
~ 7"',-"
0a
Tj
0
1
you1
pla
f e the nonetary ecuivalent of ;,ermormance. lhy,
then, the imitations in Clark v. Har.siflia, and E-adley v.
Baxenda!.? Tncidntally. does the student 'ain insoiht into
tho psroblecs raised in those to oases by ntudyin offer and
acontae: . and. conside.-tion? On the oth6'r hand, do not these
iitLtions
cone ubi}constantly
in
offer
Of r . Davies.
.m"'.
.U='
~ and, ct.o...
Ie
v a
tatY o-enin- -ot f". Jac!keonz, ,!,etc.)
Atin, what prenaation for the subject of liouidated
danzwTes does the student ret fron studyin.g; ofrer ann acceptance,
1apoezibility, etc.? On the other hand, is not the problem,
how far will a court go in giving the plaintiff the monetary
ecill'a2.snt of .whatwas promised hin (ehich is involved in this
s6ject), one which cuts across eiany of the problens raised
under the coventional rubrics? I think pafticularly of your
case on .age 649.
About the two cases you mention specifically. Boone v. Coe
was a case aere the defendant contracted orally to give the
plaintiff a lease on property inTexas. Inreliance on the
oral promise the plaintiff moved from Kentucky to Tezas, whele
he was not permitted to go into possession of the remises.
He sues for the cost of moving. The court denies tis recovery,
but says itwould have oiven him a return of benefits had any
been conferzed on the defendant. I rould ask about thUs case:
N How far does the court gn here inp-otecting the -proisee?
I hy is it more Tilling
(2j Th di- it stowD vhele it did', (731
to cor el a return of benefits than to reimburse reaance?
,t the case involves a peculiar Ken-tackv docTine
4,L
of part perforrnance. I don't follow this. The perfor:ance
here was not of a type to take the contract out of the statute
according to §197 of the Restatement. I how lahere are cases
perfozrance
holding that the contract is taken out by .artI_al
not satisfying §197. But why raise that Oestion at all? it
is not- mentioned by the court, and I see no reason to brzing3 it
into the discussion.

My object in tlis first chapter isnot

to teach all of the law surrounding these cases; but to give
the student
'awareness of this problem of the three interests
I have mentioned, hich incidentally, of course, do not need to
be called Ointezests.4

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
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You also mention the abstracted case, Rabinovitz v. Marcus,
100 Conn. 86. That case held that the buyer under a land contract could, on default by the seller, recover (1)naynents
made and (2)reiabursement for reliance. it wras ut in to be
o
a plaintiff
conriared with Timnerman v. Stanley, which held tiaqt
could not sue .on"the contract for losses through reliance,
and recover benefits conferred, since the to recoveries were
inconsistent with one anotl!r.
(.n,
deitaUl, -is not ?adLey
v. jxendale hoverin in Me back row.d here I
You say of the ",abinovitz case that it"illustrates one
of he :ules of re!.edy inland sales oso, ad I tak it yu
have inferred that that was its sir;nificance for me. I see no
reason in discussing this case to go into the -,robleil of the
conflict about the measure of recovory in the land cases. For
me it illustr.tes a more general zoblen, can the laintiff .ot
restitution of L-nefits and reirlz-sement of reliance in one
suit?
As a aterof Ic
onnecticut is cited by "o"orlaic as
a jurisdictioin following the loss-of-begain rule. But even
in such, juisdictions, as the Fa'oinovitz case illustrates, probably the plaintiff can restrict his demand to a reibursement
of reliance. But I see no reason to drag all this into the discussion.
1 tabted yesterday with Seavey about this first chanter.
He shares your doubts about its teachability. On the other
hand, he and Thurston - their new book are including restitution in their discussion of Jeceit. In other words, they have
encountered exzaztly the same difficulty in dealing with one
aspect of deceit in isolation from other aspects than I have
encountered in contracts. I called this to his atsentic.
is

answer was te- this was only a smali part of their course.

I

said, BYes, in the one branch of tort law here the problem i
an concerned ith is involved, you adopt sabstantia~y the
aonroach i do. But the problem is wrItten across the whole of
contract law."
When I taught Personal ?ropezty I made a reform in the
course which corresponds almost ezactly to the one Iropose
for ,-ontracts.
The usual order in that course is to take Uo
first, -hat is possession? and then, Lhat are the lega consequences of possession? I reversed this order. I was told
that it would be imossible to teach the subject this vay;
tbat students would want to know what possession was before
talking about its legal consequences; that the problem, Mhat
is possession? was something vithin the scope of their previous
exoerience rhile the problem of legal renedies and consequences
was one foreign to that experience. Yet ! tught the subject
this way for three years, Vithout any of these difficulties

Professoz Arthur L. Corbin

maniIesting themselves.

-
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Novmber 24 !941

In my own opinion the new order was

an i iense inprovemont over the old from the standpoint of
inoartin:7 a functional conception of legal rules. 1Naturally,

my experience inPersonal property does not guarantee a simiri
lar success an Contracts. -On the other hands it has gven me
a Certain i.1nit to the car of 'imuossible.'
I taled yesterday ith Turn-r mad he is quite agreeable
vm.et f;004 This will e.ble
to br-.' i- the :oo1': out ina
me to ado-ot your emcu.Ilent suw;t stion that the char)tr be tried
in
Cuctice Wo.IFo ceing defiitely i.cru]o-1oated in the beok.
As a result of your suggestions I am also goinf to see
It
that the rest of the book can stand independently of the
f Irs cha.)ter. so that those Hho don't like it can leave it
out. ?o'::1d this end 1 am uakin a minor ,mdification in the
u aion.
p
ulsection,
on i
t.ithin the neZt two or three days I1ll send you on about
to

typewritten
half the subject of mutual assent, along with ea entire
subject
, inte second half.
list of te
is nom finished, but I don't like to entnast the whole thing
to the !ails at once. iPm r,;aorably conident that you will
feel that I am treading on more certain ,round from now on.
2ne first chapter is indeed the only thing which can be called
"revolutionmy about my arrangement. I'm ging to t.t to
keen n open mind about its advisability, am I hope you will
do the same.
Sincerely

LF::KGL

November 25D 1941

Professor Arthur L. Corbin
Yale University School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut
Dear Professor Corbin:
I enclose about half the subject of mutual
assent, along with a list
of the cases and notes
for the remainder of the subject.
I also enclose
a list of the section headings for this chapter.
i have included the three cases on mutual
mistake of fact (as contrasted with "misunderstand'
ig aaf
as in the Peerless case) because i have found
it very difficult
to study the cases of unilateral
mistake without a background of these cases.
You
will
notice that Jones v. Great Northern and its
notes tend to integrate the subject matter of the
section and reveal the relation between the parol
evidence rule and the problems discussed at the
beginning of the section,
Sincerely,

LLF:HGL

YALE UNIVRSITY
SCHOOL OF lAW
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
L CORSIN
ARTHUR
PROFESSOR
Of 1AW

December 3, 1941.

Professor L. L. Fuller
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Mr. Fuller:
I have given your manuscript on Mutual Assent a "once-over",
reading the new cases and notes and observing changes in order and in
emphasis. Of the 30 old cases that are omitted I shall miss a few:
some because they are simple and clear illustrations such as Port Huron
v. Voers, Carlill v.Smoke Ball Company, 3.& M. R. R. Co. v. Bartlett;
others because I usually spend some effort on their analysis, such as
Mott v. Jackson, Bishop v.Eaton, Wheeler v, McStay, Cooke v. Oxley and
Hopkins v. Racine Iron Company. It may well be, however, that the book
has had too many cases and that your omissions are justified for reasons
that include an economy of time and space.
I have not had time or energy to consider critically either
your new arrangement of the cases or the "teachability" of the new cases.
My impression -was generally good, although the opinion in Scammell v.
Ouston did not impress me very well. Also I have some question about
including the parol evidence rule in the first chapter. I have written
a chapter on that rule in my treatise; and I do not admire its operation
in the courts. It is a handy doctrine by which to disregard flimsy and
dishonest testimony. ,hen used for more than that it is likely to do
serious injustice. The courts have frequently disregarded it without
giving it a thought. Just as in the case of your Introductory Chapter,
however, I know that it is not here your intention to exhaust the subject.
Every teacher has personal opinions as to analysis and order
of presenting topics and cases. You are entitled to try your own experiments along this line.
Iistake is indeed a hard subject for either analysis or synthesis. I have not yet written my chapter on it; but I have run against
it here and there, as in Mutual Assent and Interpretation.
Your reply to my criticism of the Introductory Chapter was very
interesting. I have no doubt that, like most other people, you can make
your own system work. Itis my hope that you may present your materials
in so convincing a form that others mill understand and be convinced,
Your ideas about Remedies are not far removed from mine except in the
matter of the Introductory Chapter. Our presentation to the students
may not be very different.

Professor L. L. Fuller

December 3, 1941.

My brief comments on your first chapter and on specific cases
in it were inadecuate. Boone v. Coe called to my mind my study of the
part performance doctrine, made subsequently to the making of the Restatement. Section 197 of that document does no truly represent the
cases. Just as in the case of the parol evidence rule the courts have
manhandled the statute of frauds in order to prevent it from doing serious injustice. Of course you can use the Kentucky case or some special
land casefor your limited purpose .ithout considering whether or not it
lays down a minority rule or even a good rule,
Yourtreatment of "possession," its facts and its consequences,
does no offense to my analytical notions. No doubt the term expresses'
both fact and legal relation. Ve must continually work from one element
to the other and back again..
I am mailing to you simultaneously with this the manuscript
of gutual Assent.
Yours sincerely,

PLC :V

-
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Larch 11, 1942

Professor Arthuz L. Cor n
Yale University School of Law
lew Haven, Colrecticut

nL.'e been wantin- to urite you for a long tine, but
my plic have been so uncert~an that I have put if off until
o " say
definite
...
about the work on the cat:ebook.
The definite thi n that i now have to say is that 1 shall be
conpelled to discontinue work on it, probably for the dur:tion. Aiincw t'ae less inmediate consecuences of Pearl Harbor
is tbe fact that Harard now has a considerable sur!,lus of
law arofeso-rs. Na-t' ally, t..ose of us who tU)"
t.t we
a cerctood Qone choance of r-,ebtiriz a job elsaene.hv
tami obli:?ation t look about for such a chance.
-.nU1 I was

debating between staying here and going to ashin;ton, the
Bosto.fir., of ices, ~Gray, Best, Coolidge lid Furgg caiCe through
with e offer which I accepted on a trial basis.
cov.i;: Zo
resent plans, I shall start repoting for duty w.ith them, about
the fi st of April.

11o
doubt you rill be as distressed as I an to see the work
suspended. As you know, I have practically finished the whole
subjeCt of Consideration and Hutual Assent. Certain other subjects, especially Conditions, Assignments, and Third Party Beneficiaries, i have outlined and put in shape to assemble rather
rapidly. On those subjects I have made a classified card index
of all the cases printed in the leading casebooks, as well as
of recent oases that I bave dug out for myself.
I
is not
though
ing to

am writing to 9r. Turner today. gy guess is that Nest
especially eager to bring out new books during the war,
it is possible that they, like the rest of us, are trycarry on as usual as long as they can.

geed-less to say, the interrption of this work is the most
irksome aspect of my own impending f3ing at law practice. Hy
noae is t'at a soeedy termination of the
'ermit
war will
me to
oick it no apin without too much loss of momentmn.
Sincerely yours,

LLIP: 1101
L

LLF'
L~Ton
L. ~u~e

